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CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN FRANCE
Charles Torem* and William Laurence Craig**
I.

INTRODUCTION

principle of freedom of investment by foreigners in France
has, with few statutory exceptions, long been recognized in
French law. In practice, however, exchange controls, requiring
French government authorization for all foreign exchange transactions within France, have supplied the legal foundation for governmental control of foreign investment. Initiated in 1939 as a wartime
measure to stem the outflow of the nation's currency to safer havens,1
exchange controls were continued in the postwar era to protect a
weak currency and were elaborated, in piecemeal fashion, to suit
diverse and changing governmental policies. The complex and pervasive regulations provided an instrument which could be used not
only to protect France's monetary position but also to safeguard
other national interests affected by foreign investment. In fact, exchange controls were used by the government to screen all foreign
investment, and to limit those deemed inconsistent with French economic planning or political interests.
As the French economy grew strong and the franc grew stable, the
appropriateness of the entire institution of exchange controls became
increasingly debatable. The existence of such controls weakened the
claim of the franc to a status akin to that of the world's reserve currencies and cast doubt upon the feasibility of making Paris a financial center for Europe. Moreover, at least by the early 1960's, the
government had tacitly accepted that foreign payments, trade, and,
in large measure, investments would generally be authorized once
administrative formalities had been accomplished. These administrative formalities served, however, as a not inconsequential barrier to
routine international transactions. The sea of papers to be prepared
by industries engaged in international transactions and to be pro-

T

HE

• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1935, Amherst College; LL.B. 1938, Harvard
University.
•• Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. A.B. 1954, Williams
College; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University.
The authors acknowledge the valuable assistance of Alan Rau and Richard Schepard
in the preparation of this article.
I. Decree of Sept. 9, 1939, [1939] J.O. 11266. While the modem history of French
exchange control can be said to date from 1939, certain texts, such as the Law of May
31, 1916, [1916] J.O. 4840, which was enacted to control certain stock issues during the
First World War, continued in vigor until the present enactments.

[ 669]

670

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:669

cessed by an overburdened administration served an interest of governmental control which was infinitesimal in comparison with the
cost in time, delays, and missed opportunities for the French economy engendered by the whole procedure. Exchange control regulation was thus ripe for reform.
When, on December 28, 1966, President de Gaulle signed into
law the bill rescinding all the previous laws, decrees, and regulations
relating to exchange controls,2 it seemed as if the millennium had at
last been achieved. The law seemed firmly to adhere to the principle of free exchange, the first article stating that "[f]inancial relations between France and other countries are free." The law itself,
however, set forth only the barest outline of the future pattern of
controls; according to the well-established practice the government
and not the parliament determines the methods by which an economic or social program is carried out.3 Thus, it was only with the
subsequent publication, on January 29, 1967, of the regulations under the law that the real content and effect of the new exchange
and investment control program was clearly established.4 Reaction to
these new regulations was enthusiastic: government officials an•
nounced that a new era of economic freedom in international relations had begun, 5 and various commentators concurred.6 But while
it is true that the new regulations largely abolish control of foreign
exchange as such, there has been no substantial liberalization of
governmental control over investments by foreigners in France.
Indeed, under the new regulations investments are submitted to
control procedures which, in certain circumstances, are more rigorous than antecedent measures.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE NEW LEGISLATION
A. Prior Exchange Controls in France
While exchange controls under prior French law in general,7
and their application to American investment in particular,8 have
2. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, [1966) J.O. 11621.
3. Article 34 of the Constitution of 1958 explicitly limits the legislative powers of
parliament, while art. 37 reserves to the government areas that are outside of parliamentary competence. The practice of the Fifth Republic has been to make maximum
use of this constitutional fact to increase government powers. See, e.g., A. HAuRiou,
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 805-06 (1967).
4. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967) J.O. 1073.
5. See, e.g., Larre (Financial Minister to the French Embassy, Washington), The
Liberalization of French Exchange Controls: A Step Towards More Freedom for the
Movement of Capital, FRENCH AM. COMMERCE 18 (March-April 1967).
6. Urquhart, France Drops Its Currency Restrictions, International Herald Tribune,
Jan. 31, 1967, at 1, col. I.
7. Jeantet, Exchange and Control Regulations in France, in 1 AMERICAN ENTERl'RISE
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 189 (E. Stein &: T. Nicholson eds. 1960).
8. Dusart, The Impact of the French Government on American Investment in
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been treated in depth elsewhere, a brief discussion of the law and
regulations until recently in force will give some idea of the extent
to which these regulations reached into every aspect of French international life. Studied with data on the dimensions of foreign investment in France, an historical analysis provides a necessary perspective from which to view the changes created by the new rules.
The basic structure of the old system was relatively simple: the
laws simply forbade all transactions involving foreign exchange or
foreign transfers, except those authorized by regulation.9 Certain
transactions defined in these exchange controls required prior authorization of the Ministry of Finance. In other cases, transfers or investments meeting restricted criteria could be made without specific
authorization of the Ministry of Finance upon simple verification
by those banks designated as authorized intermediaries (intermedaires agrees)1° which had accordingly received a limited delegation of authority from the Ministry of Finance. In all cases the old
regulations required transactions involving international payments
to be effected through such authorized intermediaries. Functionally,
the regulations categorized all persons as "residents" or "nonresidents" of France; all transactions between the two groups were subject to control.11 Reflecting the understanding that exchange controls
were to regulate problems involving foreign monies and not foreign
influence, nationality of the persons or corporations played no substantial part in the application of controls.12
Controls applicable to any one problem had to be ferreted out
from a morass of overlapping laws, decrees, regulations, and notices
which in total comprised some 750 finely printed pages in one of
the service publications designed to collate these disparate texts. In
order to describe the over-all purport of these controls, it is perhaps
easiest to classify them into three general categories: international
payments, international trade, and international investment.
The first category included controls over importation and exportation of gold, importation of foreign currency13 and exportation
of francs, and the use of foreign bank accounts by resident nationFrance, 7 HARV. !NT'L L. Cum J. 75
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FRANCE (1965).

(1965). See also A.

JOHNSTONE, UNITED STATES

9. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, arts. 2, 3, [1947] J.O. 6987.
IO. See Avis No. 791 of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Aug. 14, 1966,
[1966] J.O. 7175, providing the latest list of "intermediaires agrees."
11. See Arr~te of July 15, 1947, [1947] J.O. 6993.
12. There were, however, some limited advantages to foreign citizenship. Resident
aliens in France were exempted from certain requirements which would have required
all residents to declare their assets abroad, to repatriate their foreign income, and, in
some instances, to repatriate the assets themselves.
13. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, [1947] J.O. 6987.
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als14 and of French bank accounts by nonresidents. 15 This was the
literal control of foreign exchange.
The second category dealt mainly with controls over those transactions creating obligations eventually calling for the transfer of
foreign exchange. Included here were restrictions affecting all imports and exports, even those made without payment.16 The mechanism for controlling such transfers of merchandise was a mandatory
licensing procedure for all importers and exporters, coupled with a
requirement that payment for all such purchases and sales be made
through authorized intermediaries.17 The purpose of the import
controls was primarily to protect the French balance of payments
position; and when this position improved, controls on imports were
relaxed.18 Control of exports was intended primarily to insure that
proceeds of export sales were in fact repatriated to France.19
The third category, international investment, included control
of French investment abroad and foreign investment in France. Investment abroad by French nationals was tightly controlled: authorization by the Ministry of Finance was needed in order to acquire
foreign assets; 20 purchase of foreign stock without specific authorization was permitted only in limited circumstances; 21 and repatriation
of all income earned on foreign investments was mandatory. 22 Rules
controlling foreign investment in France were highly complex and
no less rigorous. Certain transactions-the purchase of French stock on
the Bourse,23 the purchase of real estate or investment in real estate
companies,24 and loans of less than one million francs to residents at
14. While the opening of a foreign bank account as such was not forbidden by the
regulations, its use and the failure to repatriate foreign exchange ordinarily constituted an exchange control violation. Arrete of July 15, 1947, arts. 12, 14, [1947] J.O.
6993; see Ministerial response in the National Assembly to questions posed by a
depute on Jan. 16, 1965, [1965] J.O. (Debats Parlementaires de l'Assemblee Nationale)
38 (No. 12461).
15. Arrete of July 15, 1947, arts. 27-30, [1947] J.O. 6993.
16. See generally Avis of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, annxs. I, II,
Jan. 30, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1130, 1131, for a complete list of old regulations relating to
trade.
17. See Decree of Nov. 30, 1944, published in R.ECUEIL DES TEXTES DU l\IINISTERE DE
L'ECONOMIB ET DES FINANCES, LOIS, DECRETS, ORDONNANCES ET ARRttls 18 (3d ed. 1966),
setting up a wartime prohibition of imports and exports without individual licenses.
This regime was subsequently relaxed by provision for blanket licenses.
18. Avis aux importateurs and Avis No. 727 of Nov. 25, 1961, [1961] J.O. 10825.
19. Arrete of July 15, 1947, arts. 12-18, [1947] J.O. 6993; Avis aux exportateurs and
Avis No. 783 of Sept. 11, 1965, [1965] J.O. 8108.
20. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, art. 23, [1947] J.O. 6987.
21. See Arrete of March 16, 1962, art. 7, [1962] J.O. 3055.
22. Arrete of July 15, 1947, art. 12, [1947] J.O. 6993.
23. Avis No. 762 of Aug. 21, 1963, [1963] J.O. 7730, amending Avis No. 669 of
Jan. 21, 1959, tit. I, para. A(l), [1959] J.O. 1130.
24. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, art. 51(1), [1947] J.O. 6987; Avis No. 716 of
July 23, 1960, [1960] J.O. 6774, amending Avis No. 669 of Jan. 21, 1959, tit. I, [1959]
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a rate of interest not exceeding four per cent-did not require special authorization of the Ministry of Finance but had to be effected,
nonetheless, through authorized intermediaries. Other transactions
-the formation of French commercial companies, the establishment
of branch offices in France,25 the investment in French companies not
listed on the Bourse, and the patent, trademark, or know-how agreements with residents, 26 to name a few-required authorization by the
1\Hnistry of Finance, no matter whether the investment was to be
made in cash, or contributions in kind; and, once again, all payments
had to be made through authorized intermediaries.

B. The Dimensions of the Foreign Investment Problem
Since exchange controls find their justification in the protection
of a weak balance of payments and protection against local currency
outflows, it is only with great difficulty that the justification for
having applied these rules to measure and control foreign investment
in France can be found. Foreign investment, financed with capital
exported from the investor's own country, has actually strengthened
France's balance of payments position.27 Indeed, even if one accepts
the artificial assumption that every foreign investment carries with
it the prospect of eventual disinvestment and the conversion of the
proceeds into foreign currency, no real balance of payments problem
can be found. It was estimated in 1965, by the French, that cumulative foreign investment in France totaled $5 billion, which may be
compared with an unofficial estimate of $8 billion as the cumulative
total of French investment abroad. 28 Total American investment,
J.O. ll30. See also Note No. 498 of March 19, 1964, from the Minister of Finance and
of the Economy to authorized intermediaries.
25. Although technically it was investment in a branch office and not the creation
of a branch itself that was subject to prior Ministry of Finance authorization, as a
practical matter the establishment of a branch office almost always entails some expenditure, and therefore authorization was usually needed upon creation. The fact
that such authorization carried with it the right to disinvest provided an independent
interest in making application.
26. Decree No. 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, art. 2, [1947] J.O. 6993.
27. Where foreign investment is financed by money raised in France, a trend which
is now well defined in the case of American investment, there is, of course, no positive
contribution to the French balance of payments. It has been estimated that fifty-five
per cent of American investment in Europe in 1965 was financed on the European
capital market, thirty-five per cent by European government subsidies and self-financing, and only ten per cent by transfer of dollars from the United States. See Address
by Oliver Guichard, Minister of Industry, to the American Chamber of Commerce in
France, COMMERCE IN FRANCE No. 242, at 15 (Dec. 15, 1967).
28. MINISTERE

DE L'lNDUSJ1UE, RAPPORT SUR LES !NVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS DANS

t'INDUSTRIE FRANyAISE 3 (1965) (Bockanowski Report). The estimate of French investment abroad is attributed to Marcel Cazes, Directeur General of the Credit Lyonnais
Bank.
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which the French consider to be a special problem, amounted to
about $2.5 billion,29 while French investments in the United States
have been unofficially estimated at about $2 billion.80
But if foreign investment does not pose the kind of problem for
which exchange controls, as such, are a traditional remedy, still the
French consider foreign investment to pose other problems necessitating some kind of government surveillance. Direct investment,
involving control by foreigners of French enterprises, is of greatest
concern to the French, and foreign, particularly American, investment has in recent years been largely of this sort. While accurate
statistics as to the cumulative value of foreign direct investment in
France and the American share of this total are difficult to obtain, it
is roughly estimated by French sources that $4 billion of the total
$5 billion foreign investment figure is direct investment,81 and
American sources further estimate that American direct investment
constitutes $1.75 billion.32
The impact of such foreign investments on particular industries
is demonstrated by a Ministry of Finance study indicating that the
following percentages of production in 1962 originated from firms in
which foreign investment accounted for ownership of twenty per
cent or more of the capital of the firm: 33
Musical instruments
Gasoline and petroleum products
Radio and television services
Fat products
Precision instruments, optics, and watches
Rubber and asbestos
Film production

45.6%
43.0%
45.7%
36.4%
34.0%
24.5%
16.0%

The Ministry of Industry has made a further study, breaking
down the categories into particular products, and has found that
companies in which Americans owned at least twenty per cent of the
29. Id. at 4.
30. :Bojin, French Investments in the United States, COMMERCE IN FRANCE No. 219,
at ix (1966). Most of this amount is portfolio investment rather than direct investment.
31. M1NISTERE DE L'!NDUSTRIE, supra note 28. The statistics appear to be valid as of
the end of 1962.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT :BUSINESS 42 (Sept. 1967) (estimate
based on situation at the end of 1966). At the end of 1962 the cumulative value of
United States investment was $1.63 billion. The over-all effect of such investment
should not be overestimated, however, as foreign investment constitutes only five to
eight per cent of total French capital investment. [1966) J.O. (Avis et Rapports du
Conseil Economique et Social) 11 (May 28, 1966). See also Le Monde, Jan. 14-15, 1968,
at 7, col. 2 for 1967 statistics.
33. MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, STATISTIQUES ET ETUDES FINANCIERS
No. 219, at 326 (March 1967).
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capital accounted for the following percentages of 1963 production:34
Razor blades and safety razors
Adding machines
Bottle caps
Sewing machines
Electric razors
Statistical and electronic equipment
Telegraph and telephone equipment
Tractors and agricultural equipment
Refrigerating equipment
Industrial furnaces
These statistics are indicative of a situation which raises a very
real fear in French governmental circles of foreign takeovers of certain key sectors of the French economy. These figures, however, are
somewhat out of date and do not illustrate the effect of the most
recent boosts in foreign investment; rather, they tell only a very
small part of the story. Annual foreign direct investment tripled
between 1960 and 1964.35 Annual American direct investment,
which, according to French sources, amounted to twenty-eight per
cent of foreign direct investment in 1964,36 led investment by any
other country by a large margin. 37
American statistics indicate the following progression of United
States annual direct investment in France: 38
1959

1960

1961

51

53

%

(millions of dollars)
1962
1963
1964
IM

IM

I~

1965

1966

152

93

34. MINISTER£ DE L'!NDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 25, 26.
35. Response in the National Assembly of M. Debre, Ministry of Finance, to question of M. Albert Fouet, depute, on May 27, 1966, [1966] J.O. 1537. See also MINISTER£
DE L'ECONOMlE ET DES FINANCES, BALANCE DES PAIEMENTS DE L'ANNEE 1966, at 122-23 ijuly
1967) (recapitulating balance of payments position from 1959 to 1966); MINISTER£ DE
L'INDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 3.
36. Response by M. Debre in the National Assembly, supra note 35. For a statement that United States direct investment constituted forty-five per cent of the direct
investment approved by the Ministry of Industry in 1964, see MINISTER£ DE L'INDUSTRIE,
supra note 28, at 4, 9. It should be recalled that not all investment applications submitted to the Ministry of Finance are necessarily referred to the Ministry of Industry.
If direct investment and long-term loans are considered together, United States participation was only twenty-five per cent in 1964. [1966) J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil
Economique et Social) 377, 400 (May 28, 1966).
37. The runners-up are generally considered to be Switzerland, Great Britain, Belgium, and Germany. See MINISTER£ DE L'INDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 4, 9; [1966] J.O.
(Avis et Rapports du Economique et Social) 377, 400 (1-:fay 28, 1966). The Ministry of Finance statistics, prepared from a balance of payment point of view, probably
overvalue investment from Switzerland and Belgium, which are used by third countries
as transit points for investment in France.
38. U.S. DEP'T OF CoMIIU:RCE, supra note 32, at 22 (Aug. 1961), 22 (Aug. 1962), 18
(Aug. 1963), IO (Aug. 1964), 24 (Sept. 1965), 34 (Sept. 1966), 42 (Sept. 1967).
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These figures, based on net capital outflow, 39 indicate United States
direct investment from a current balance of payments viewpoint.
Probably of even greater concern to the French is the steady increase in the value of cumulative American investment in France, as
illustrated in the chart below: 40
1959
640

1960
741

1961
860

(millions of dollars)
1962
1963
1964
1,630

1,240

1,446

1965
1,609

1966
1,758

Since these figures take into account not only additional yearly
investments, but also retention of earnings of French subsidiaries
of United States companies, they indicate quite accurately the full
economic power of the American capital invasion.
The impact of foreign investment on the French economy is accentuated by the concentration of a very high proportion of annual
foreign investment in a few large commitments; 41 the large foreign
investor undoubtedly has a great deal more influence over the French
economy than do the hundreds of small investors who are permitted
each year to enter the French economy without much difficulty.
Moreover, the companies which attract foreign takeovers are very
often in technologically advanced industries, where foreign control
is particularly suspect, due to the feeling that foreign ownership
leads to dependence on foreign research and development, payment
of technical assistance fees abroad, and inhibition of purely French
advanced technology.
Considering that France has a planned economy, upon which
traditionally controlled foreign investments exert a substantial impact, it was predictable that abolition of the entire exchange control
apparatus would not necessarily liberate foreign investment from
all control. Examination of the new law and its regulations demonstrates the importance which the French have lent to maintaining
and intensifying control of such investment despite the general abolition of exchange controls.
III.

THE

NEW REGIME OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN FRANCE

A. The Structure of the Law
The proposed law on foreign economic relations presented to the
National Assembly in December 1966 provided both a broad, gen39. Both "direct investment" and "net capital outflow" as defined in the Sept. 1967
SURVEY, supra note 32, at 46-47, include loans from United States parent companies to
subsidiaries and investment in plant and equipment from proceeds of foreign loans or
other financing.
40. See authority cited in note 38 supra.
41. See, e.g., analysis of foreign investment in the chemical industry, MINIST.ERE DE
L'lNDUSTRIE, supra note 28, at 17-18.
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eral outline of the new liberty in international finance and a succinct, clear guide to the powers of the government to impose limits
on this freedom.
Article I declared: "Financial relations between France and
other countries are free," and article 2 went on to list the text of
prior exchange control laws and decrees, all of which, together with
their implementing regulations, were expressly revoked. 42 It is clear,
however, that this freedom was to be of the qualified, relative sort.
Thus, article I goes on to say that "this liberty shall be exercised in
the manner provided by the present law .... " Moreover, article 3
in effect gave to the executive the power to re-enact by decree-but
only in order to assure the defense of national interests-provisions
highly similar in nature to the very exchange or investment controls
that had just been abrogated. Thus, the government was empowered
to:
1° Submit to declaration, prior authorization or control:
a) Exchange operations, capital movements, and payments of all
kinds between France and other countries;
b) The constitution, transformation of the nature of, and the liquidation of French assets abroad;
c) The constitution and the liquidation of foreign investments in
France;
d) The importation and exportation of gold as well as all other material movements of securities between France and other countries;
2° Provide for the repatriation of all credits existing abroad arising from the exportation of merchandise, the payment for services
rendered, and in a general way, all foreign income or revenues;
3° To empower intermediaries to affect the operations cited in
paragraphs (a) and (d) above.
The bill was considered by the Finance Committee of the National Assembly and a report summarizing the purpose of the law
was presented by the Committee shortly thereafter, on December 13,
1966, through Louis Vallon, a prominent Gaullist deputy. In this
report Michel Debre, Minister of Finance, commented on the new
law as follows:
The economic and financial recovery of the country and the new
42. One of the complaints of practitioners has been that the list of the texts relating
to exchange controls which have been repealed is by no means exhaustive, and there
remains some question as to whether certain regulations which marginally touch upon
exchange controls are still in effect. On this subject, see R. La Claviere, La Nouvelle
Reglementation des Relations Financieres avec l'Etranger, (1967) Sem. Jur. I. 2071, at
para. 53. Article 4 of the law provided that prior controls over exports, imports, and
insurance were not repealed. They were, however, subsequently revised and relaxed by
departmental regulation. Arr~te of the Minister of the Economy- and of Finance, Jan.
30, 1967, (1967) J.O. 1108.
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orientation of our economic policy arising, in particular from our
international agreements, have already permitted a progressive relaxation of exchange controls. In many cases a regime of freedom has
been re-established. In law, however, exchange controls remain, which
is not without practical disadvantages. Administrative formalities
remain numerous. Badly informed as to the present state of complex
regulations, parties concerned often do not know whether or not
they have committed an infraction. Finally, the maintenance of exchange controls seems scarcely compatible with the orientation of
the Brussels negotiations. The return of the liberty of financial relations with other countries must not, however, take away from the
government all possibility of action. The French and European
conception of liberty in this area must be more restricted than the
American conception. The government must maintain a certain
control over foreign investments in France or French investments
abroad. It must also be able to reestablish controls in certain sectors
if exceptional events justify them. The proposed text is not designed
to permit the government to enlarge the scope of its interventions,
but, on the contrary, to supply more clearly a new legal basis for
these interventions.4 3

The bill was passed by the National Assembly on December 14,
1966, and adopted by the Senate with only minor modifications on
December 16. On December 28, the bill was signed by the President
of the Republic and became Law No. 66-1008.44
The law gave the French government thirty days in which to
take advantage of the provisions of article 3: if by January 31, 1967
-the outside limit for the effective date of the Act-no such regulations as provided for in article 3 had been promulgated, the financial relations between France and foreign nations would indeed have
been entirely "free," for exchange controls having been abolished,
no controls of any sort would have existed as to foreign investment
in France. The two governmental decrees issued within the thirtyday deadline established, however, an elaborate set of foreign investment controls producing a significant change of emphasis from
the law's concept of freedom.

B. Structure of the Enabling Decrees and Regulations
Based upon the report of the Ministry of Finance on January 27,
1967, the Prime Minister issued Decree No. 67-7845 prescribing the
modes of application of the previously enacted law. The decree was
43. Rapport No. 2253, Premiere Session Ordinaire, 1966-67, Annex to minutes of
session of Dec. 13, 1967, at 33.
44. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, [1966] J.O. 11621.
45. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073.
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completed by departmental regulation (arrete) of the same date. 46
The loose draftsmanship of this regulation, which has raised myriad
problems of interpretation, was thought by some to bear the marks
of a haste necessitated by the thirty-day "statute of limitations."
Decree No. 67-78 deals with most major aspects of international
finance and investment, including investment abroad by French
residents; this Article, however, will basically be limited to a detailed
examination of the problem of foreign investment in France.
The decree establishes three major categories of international
investment and financing:
I. Direct investments (investissements directs), as that term is defined in the decree, in France by nonresidents (or investment
abroad by French residents), which investments are subject to a
declaration procedure before the Ministry of Finance and which
may be blocked by the Ministry;
2. Borrowings from abroad, within limits defined by the decree, by
French residents, which borrowings are subject to specific prior
authorization by the Ministry of Finance; and
3. Investments not constituting "direct investments" as defined in
the decree and foreign financing not specifically subject to the
authorization procedure, neither of which are subject to governmental control.

The decree and arrete further require the specific prior authorization by the Minister of Finance before public offerings on the
French market of foreign securities will be permitted, 47 a special
requirement which is not, however, substantially more rigorous than
are the procedural requirements under French law for the public
offering of French securities.48 Special provision is made for the
importation and exportation of gold upon declarations with customs
after prior report to the Bank of France.49
Despite the abolition of exchange controls the decree and arrete
provide for reporting by French residents to authorized intermediaries, for statistical purposes, of all financial transactions abroad. 50
The authorized intermediaries must, in turn, report these financial
46. Arr~te of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O.
1074.
47. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 5, [1967] J.O. 1073. An exception is made
for securities already listed on the "Bourse," and bonds which have been guaranteed
by the French government.
48. It may be, however, that authorization for sale of foreign securities will not be
liberally granted in view of the capital requirements of the French market. See Brock,
The Reform of French Exchange Controls, 22 Bus. LAw. 985 (1967).
49. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 8, [1967] J.O. 1073.
50. Id. art. 9; Arr~te of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 27, 1967,
art. 11, [1967] J.O. 1074.
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transactions to the Bank of France, which has the power to request
further information regarding the transactions in question.
Alongside this mechanism of control of investments, but not
pursuant to the authority of Law No. 66-1008, a separate system of
control was established for the acquisition by French domiciliaries
of industrial property rights, know-how, and technical assistance
from foreign domiciliaries. This field had been previously governed
by strict Ministry of Finance controls abolished by the new law;
a separate Decree, No. 67-82, 51 issued by the Prime Minister at the
same time as the decrees on investment, now requires that contracts
providing for such acquisitions be submitted to the Ministry of Industry through a notification procedure (avis).
Finally, arretes of the Ministry of Finance and of the Director of
the Customs Service52 revoked all regulations relating to import and
export promulgated pursuant to prior exchange control laws and
decrees. Although a restricted number of transactions (such as exportation of items on the forbidden strategic list) are still subject
to prior authorization, the new procedures initiated by these arretes
provide substantial liberty of trade.
This collection of laws, decrees, and regulations spans the entire
field of international trade and investment as dealt with by the previous French exchange control regulations. In contrast to prior law,
however, that which is not expressly forbidden is now permitted;
now, in order to block or delay an investment, the government must
assume the burden of intervening and expressing its dissatisfaction
with a proposed financing arrangement. But the fact remains that
the new regime provides a wide-ranging mechanism for the surveillance, control, and, if deemed necessary, the limitation of foreign
investment and financing, a mechanism which, if routinely exploited,
might well render the new law indistinguishable from the previous
regime with its general limiting requirement of prior authorization.
C. Declaration Procedure for "Direct Investments"
The procedures for control of "direct investments" apply both
to French investments abroad and foreign investments in France.
With minor difference, the rules which apply to these two classes of
investment are the same, and, unless noted otherwise, it may be assumed that what is said here as to foreign investment in France
also applies to French investment abroad. 53
51. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1081.
52. Avis of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 30, 1967, [1967] J.O.
1127.
53. No rationalization has been given for subjecting French investment abroadfavored by government policy-to the declaration procedure. It does, however, provide
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Unlike the old exchange controls, the present regulations do not
require procurement of a government license, as such, to affect a
foreign investment in France. However, nonresident individuals or
companies must submit a declaration to the Ministry of Finance
which details any proposed direct investment. 54 In determining
whether a person or company shall be considered as a resident or
nonresident, the criterion applied by the decree is habitual residence
(residence lzabituelle) for individuals and the location of the head
office (le siege) for companies. 55 For the purpose only of the regulation of direct investments, French companies under foreign control
are treated as foreign residents and foreign companies under French
control are treated as French residents. 56 Direct investments in or
from a number of African countries, which are former members of
the French Communaute and whose currency is tied to the French
treasury, are exempted from the declaration procedure. 57
A nonresident is considered to make an investment in France,
subject to declaration, when it acquires a direct investment from
another nonresident. For example, if an American corporation
wished to acquire from another American corporation all of the
stock in its French subsidiary, such an acquisition would have to be
submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The same would be true if a
foreign corporation having a French subsidiary wishes to merge with
another foreign corporation, as the merger would involve a French
a kind of statutory reciprocity in the treatment of French and foreign investment.
Furthermore, the habits of nearly thirty years of exchange control, and the concept of
a controlled economy, militate toward making all foreign economic transactions subject to government veto. No instance of a veto of French investment abroad under
the new regulations is presently known.
54. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073.
55. Am~te of the Minister of Finance of July 15, 1947, tit. I, arts. 1-3, [1947] J.O.
6993, sets forth the criteria of habitual residence found in prior law. Nonetheless,
departmental regulations had established a rule of thumb that a foreigner would not
ordinarily acquire a French residence, nor a French citizen a foreign residence, without
two years of effective residence. Avis No. 767 of March 19, 1964, [1964] J.O. 2572. It
would appear that under the new law French residence can be claimed as soon as any
documentary evidence, notably a French residence and "carte de sejour" have been
acquired. It should be noted that "France" is defined in art. 2 of Decree No. 67-78 of
Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073, to include metropolitan France, Corsica, France's overseas departments (Guadeloupe, Guiana, Martinique, and Reunion), the overseas territories other than the French Somali Coast (Comores, New Caledonia and dependencies,
Wallis, and Futuna, French Polynesia, St.-Pierre and Miquelon), and the Principality
of Monaco.
56. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 3-l(b), 4-1, [1967] J.O. 1073. See also discussion of companies under foreign control in text accompanying note 95 infra and
passim.
57. Id. art. 7 which exempts from the declaration procedure relations with countries
"dont l'institut d't!mission est lit! au Tresor franfais par une convention de compte
d'opt!rations." These countries are presently: The Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, Senegal, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Congo, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Togo,
Cameroun, and Madagascar.
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direct investment by the acquiring corporation. The old exchange
controls law did not affect such transactions, which, as there was no
exchange of foreign currencies, were not subject to Ministry of
Finance authorization.
The declaration is made by letter, or preferably on the form
supplied by the government. The procedure following this first step
is then described by the decree:
During a period of two months following the reception of the
declaration, the Minister of Finance may request the postponement
[ajournement] of the operations contemplated. He may, nevertheless,
prior to the expiration of the two months period, renounce his right
to request postponement.58

Although a study of the text alone does not immediately reveal
the consequence of a postponement, in fact the Ministry of Finance
has the legal power to play the same role that it played under the
authorization procedure of the old exchange control regulations.
The Ministry may request temporary postponement (ajournement
provisoire) of the investment in order to allow time for further
study or to permit the applicant to modify its application along the
lines suggested by the government. If the investment is considered
unsatisfactory, and if the applicant is unwilling or unable to modify
its application to meet government objections, a permanent postponement (ajournement definitif) may be anticipated. Such an
action would, in practice, only be taken upon the personal determination of the Minister himself. The primary difference between
the present and prior procedures is that if no action is now taken
by the government within sixty days of the receipt of the declaration,
the investment is automatically acceptable.
Article 4 of the decree also provides for declaration by a foreign
resident (or by a French company under foreign control) of the
liquidation of any direct investment. However, the decree does not
specifically provide that the Minister of Finance has the right to
request postponement in such a case, and the regulations provide,
in fact, that declaration of the liquidation of an investment must be
made within twenty days after the termination of the operation.119

D. "Direct Investment" Defined
Article 2(3) of the decree supplies the key definition of "direct
investments":
58. Id. art. 4-1.
59. Arrete of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4, [1967]
J.O. 1074. Article 4 of the decree provides that the declaration of the liquidation may
be dispensed with when stock in a French corporation is transferred between foreign
residents after a declaration of investment, subject to the postponement procedure,
has been made by the transferee.
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(a) The purchase, the creation or the extension of any business
[fonds de commerce], branch or individual enterprise.
(b) All other operations which alone or together with others concurrently or consecutively, have the effect of permitting a person
or persons to acquire or increase the control of a company engaged in industrial, agricultural, commercial, financial or realty
operations, whatever may be its form, or to assure the expansion
[extension] of such company already controlled by them.
However, the sole acquisition of a participation not exceeding
20% of the capital of a company quoted on the stock exchange
shall in no case be considered as a direct investment.

Subparagraph (a) of article 2(3) deals primarily with the creation
or acquisition of personal enterprises or business not organized in
the form of companies. Such creation or acquisition on behalf of a
nonresident is subject to the declaration procedure. It is noteworthy,
moreover, that the creation of a branch (succursale) is specifically
defined as direct investment and hence is in all cases subject to the
declaration procedure. By contrast, prior exchange controls did not
require prior authorization for the opening of a branch if no foreign investment was necessary for its creation.
Subparagraph (b) of article 2(3) deals with direct investment in
companies (societes). The term "societe" includes every type of
societe which may be formed under the French Company Law of
July 24, 1966.60 These include commercial companies such as the
corporation (societe anonyme), the limited liability company (societe
a responsabilite limitee), and the limited partnership (societe en
nom collectif). Article 2(3)(b) also appears to include civil companies as provided for under articles 1832-34 of the Civil Code, and
in particular civil companies formed for realty exploitation (societes
civiles immobilieres). In this context, it is interesting to note that
prior law permitted investment by nonresidents in such societes
civiles immobilieres without intervention by the Ministry of Finance as long as payment of the purchase price was arranged through
a notaire. 61 By including the heretofore substantial foreign investments in this type of French realty company, the new law may well
exert a significant practical effect.
As defined in article 2(3)(b), an investment is a direct investment
and hence subject to the declaration procedure if the investor acquires control of a French company; or increases its pre-existing control of a French company; or finances the expansion of a company
already under its control.
60. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 6402.
61. See Avis No. 767 of March 19, 1964, [1964] J.O. 2572; Note No. 498 of the Director of Foreign Finances, March 19, 1964.

684

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:669

What constitutes control? The decree is silent as to this. Yet this
determination is a familiar corporate law exercise, in France as well
as in the United States; it is a question of fact not adapted to precise
definition. It seems certain, consequently, that the failure to define
the term was intentional. It would, of course, be impossible to enumerate all of the factual circumstances which would constitute
control-clearly it can be acquired by devices other than stock ownership-and an attempt to draft a comprehensive text would only
lead to loopholes and abuses. 62 Therefore, the French lawmakers,
utilizing a technique often seen in the United States, left the term
without statutory definition. 63
Perhaps some guidelines do exist, however, since French courts
have defined foreign control of a French company. The issue arose
under World War I laws providing for the sequestration of French
companies under enemy control, and the test was said to be whether
"the management or capital are knmvn to be in totality or in major
part in the hands of the enemy subjects." 64 The courts have applied
these criteria to various fact situations, 65 and their approach appears
to indicate that they would determine the factual issue of control
in the same way as an American court in like circumstances.
The percentage of capital ownership constituting control is
likely to vary according to the situation of the company and the provisions of its bylaws, depending, for example, upon whether or not
the company is closely held or whether the shares are in nominative
or bearer form. One thing seems relatively clear. If the notion of
control is to make any sense at all, no shareholder or group of shareholders may be held to have acquired control of a French company,
whatever his or its percentage of stock ownership, if another share62. It is interesting to note, however, that a number of French treaties attempt to
define control. See, e.g., the Franco-Algerian Convention of August 28, 1962, dealing
with the exploitation of minerals in the Sahara and defining control of a company.
Control will be considered to be exercised by French persons or companies-when
non-French persons of companies do not hold, either directly or indirectly, a
determining power in the direction and management of the enterprise, either by
the possession of more than one-half of the votes of the shares of the company,
or by any other means.
Decree No. 62-1020, Convention for the Application of para. 8 of tit. I of the Declaration of Principles Concerning Cooperation in the Exploitation of Sub-Saharan Wealth,
art. 6, [1962] J.O. 577.
63. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa to h-1 (1964), the
legislative history of which clearly indicates that it was thought undesirable to attempt
to define the term "control." H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934), quoted
in 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 772 (2d ed. 1962).
64. Regulations of the Ministry of Justice of Feb. 29, 1916, [1916] J.O. 1658, [1916]
J. DROIT lNT'L 701.
65. See, e.g., Widow Reifenberg, [1923] J. DROIT INT'L 322 (Cass. req.); for a fuller
description of the sequestration cases-, see H. BATIIFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt
227-34 (4th ed. 1967).
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holder or group of shareholders enjoys a dominant influence in the
actual management and direction of the company. Unfortunately
for the practitioner, however, it is impossible to be more precise than
this.
The only guide provided by the decree itself as to the percentage
of stock ownership that might amount to control is the provision of
article 3 stating that in no event will the sole acquisition of less than
twenty per cent of the stock of a company quoted on the French
stock exchange constitute a direct investment. 66 By inference, therefore, there is no assumption of control in such an acquisition. This
provision is designed to permit portfolio investments without submission to Ministry of Finance regulations. The percentage was intentionally set low to guard against the possibility that a relatively
small holding of shares in a large publicly owned corporation might
carry control with it. It is submitted, however, that this exception
can in no logical way be read to imply the converse proposition: that
the mmership of twenty per cent or more of the capital of a company
not quoted on the exchange does constitute control. Nonetheless,
some knowledgeable French officials seem to have inferred such a
conclusion, at least as a rule of thumb. 67
Factors other than the percentage of capital mvnership must also
be considered in resolving the factual issue of control. These other
factors 68 include the following elements listed by the Ministry of
Finance in its notice regarding declarations of direct investments:
loans or debt instruments held by the investor, real property rights,
leases and mining rights, technical assistance agreements, and licenses of industrial property rights. 69 In theory, these factors alone,
without any capital mmership, could constitute an acquisition of
control. In the ordinary case, however, such agreements would be
66. Under prior law, acquisitions of stock listed on the stock exchange could be
engaged in without specific authorization by the Ministry of Finance only if purchased
at the price quoted on the exchange. Apparently under the new controls acquisition
of up to twenty per cent of the stock of a listed company may be made at any price,
without the necessity of making a declaration.
67. The only investments subject to declaration are those giving control over a
French company to a non-resident. As a rule, participations of less than 20% of
the capital arc not considered as giving a controlling interest; conversely participations of more than 20% arc considered as giving such control. But there may be
exceptions: what is important is the notion of a controUing interest and not the
actual percentage.
Larre, The Liberalization of French Exchange Controls: A Step Toward More Freedom
of Movement of Capital, FRENCH AM. COMMERCE 18, 19 (March-April 1967).
68. See Pinto, Le Regime ]uridique des Investissements Etrangers en France, [1967]
J. DROIT INT'L 235, 248.
69. Notice of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance Regarding Declarations
of Direct Investments Made in France, April 18, 1967.
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held to constitute an acquisition or increase of control only in conjunction with a certain degree of capital ownership.
Article 2 of the decree provides that a nonresident makes a direct
investment requiring a declaration not only by acquiring control of
a French enterprise but also by increasing pre-existing control or
expanding the activities of a French company already under control.
An increase in control may be accomplished either by increasing
capital participation, giving the controlling shareholder a higher percentage in the equity, or by any of the other methods mentioned
above. Loans must also be scrutinized if either the terms or the
amounts are unusual, lest they give the lender additional influence
in the control of the borrowing company. If taken literally, the text
of the decree would appear to require resort to the declaration procedure even when the foreign shareholder merely purchases an
additional one or two shares of the controlled company, but a more
intelligent interpretation would require declaration of only those
increases in control which have some practical significance.
The notion of expansion (extension) of a controlled French
company raises certain difficulties. It would be entirely reasonable
to define such expansion as including only the addition of new activities not included in the original corporate purposes or not previously exploited by the company; 70 under this definition, foreign
prorata participation in the increase of the capital of a controlled
corporation (or loans to such a company) for the purpose of increasing production or adding to the existing means of production would
not constitute a direct investment. However, early indications from
government representatives seem to indicate that a much broader
interpretation of the term "extension" is to be applied, so as to
include mere increases in the size of the company, particularly in
productive capacity and purchase of new plant, equipment, and
assets. Under this definition, additional financing of a controlled
company could escape the declaration procedure only if its purpose
were to meet the requirements of current day to day operations.
Since a capital increase, by its nature, implies long-term expansion, investment by way of subscription to an increase of capital of
a controlled company is, as a general rule, subject to control procedures even though all shareholders retain the same percentage of
stock ownership. However, where the purpose of the capital increase
is to refinance an existing debt structure, there is no expansion.
Furthermore, the arrete specifically provides that increasing capital
70. Pinto, supra note 68, at 249.
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out of undistributed profit is not subject to declaration procedures.71
When an investment is made by way of loans to a controlled company, the presumption is that this does not constitute an extension
and that the investment regulations are not applicable. Loans are the
businessman's usual way of assuring the financing of current operations. This presumption is rebutted, however, when loans are used
to assure long-range expansion, the addition of productive capacity,
or the financing of new ventures. Of course, when a loan financing
the expansion of a controlled company does in fact constitute a
direct investment, it is subject to the normal declaration procedures
rather than the special authorization procedure applicable to foreign loans.
Determination of whether a given financing is a direct investment or just a loan poses perhaps the principal problem in the interpretation of the new foreign investment regime. When in doubt, the
investor may always confer informally with the Ministry of Finance
to obtain the advice of the civil servants concerned.
E. Prior Authorization Procedure for Foreign Loans
Section IV of the decree provides that all borrowings by individuals or companies resident in France from international institutions
or from individuals or companies resident abroad are subject to the
prior authorization (autorisation prealable) of the Ministry of
Finance. There is no parallel requirement for loans by French residents to foreign borrowers. In contrast to the provisions controlling
direct investment, foreign-controlled French companies and French
branches of foreign companies are treated as French residents and
thus must also seek authorization if they borrow from foreign
sources.72
The mechanism is precisely the same as that provided by the old
exchange control law, and should be contrasted with the new declaration procedure for direct investments. An application is made to
the Ministry of Finance, and the operation may not be undertaken
until authorization has been granted. Although there is no fixed
period of time within which the Ministry of Finance must make its
decision, in fact the ministry may generally be expected to act within
a two-month period.
Section IV of the decree, however, exempts two categories of
financing from the prior authorization procedure: loans which con71. Arr~te of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance of Jan. 27, 1967, art.
3(3) [1967] J.O. 1074.
72. Foreign branches of French companies are treated as foreign residents.
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stitute direct investments, and loans which meet restrictive criteria
supplied by the decree. I£ a foreign loan is a device to acquire control of a French company, to increase a pre-existing prior control, or
to assure the expansion of a company already under foreign control,
and is therefore a direct investment, the declaration procedures apply
rather than the prior authorization procedures. In practice, the foreign parent company engaged in financing a French subsidiary is
most likely to be affected by this provision. In each case, a judgment
will have to be made whether the loan is to be considered as financing
an expansion of the subsidiary or as merely taking the place of routine financing of current operations which ordinarily would be available from local financing institutions. In the case of an already wholly
owned French subsidiary,73 it is difficult to see how there could
be a further increase of the parent's control such as to make the declaration procedure applicable (assuming no expansion of the subsidiary's actual operations). While one can conceive of one hundred
per cent equity control being increased by further control as a creditor, it is suggested that the French government already having been
consulted, and having interposed no objection to foreign shareholder
domination of the company, should have no interest in applying, as
to loans by the foreign parent, the special declaration procedures
designed to prevent uncontrolled foreign takeovers. In such circumstances, consequently, the loan should not be subject to the declaration procedure; depending upon the amount involved, it would
either be subject to the prior authorization procedure of section IV,
or it would be free from all formalities. Where, on the other hand,
ownership of the corporation is split between a minority shareholder
group and the majority shareholder, it is, of course, easy to see how
a loan by the majority shareholder to its subsidiary could serve to
increase its control, thus constituting a direct investment subject to
the declaraion procedure. This could be true even where the majority shareholder did not make the loan itself, but merely guaranteed
a loan by a foreign bank to the French company.
A more delicate question arises where a loan to a foreign-controlled French company by a local bank in France is guaranteed by
the foreign parent company. It is submitted that such a loan, taking
place between two resident French companies, would not be subject
to the prior authorization procedure. Since the French banking insti73. Although many French subsidiaries are considered to be "wholly owned" by
foreign parent companies, the parent never owns one hundred per cent of the outstanding stock since French company law requires that there be a minimum of seven
shareholders and that each director owns a number of shares of company stock specified in the articles of incorporation and bylaws.
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tution would already be subject to all the applicable credit controls
of internal French law,74 there would be no need to add the authorization procedure appropriate to foreign loans. On the other hand,
if the loan served to increase or extend a foreign shareholder's control, then the foreign shareholder would have participated in a direct
investment and would have to make a declaration. 715
Two types of loans are exempted from the prior authorization
procedure and may be contracted freely: (a) loans from abroad to
finance services rendered abroad or commercial transactions between
France and foreign countries, 76 and (b) loans from abroad as long as
the borrower does not have a cumulative total of more than two million francs (about $400,000) of such loans outstanding.77 The former
exception is intended to recognize the necessities of normal international trade; the latter represents a considerable relaxation from
prior rules which permitted French companies to contract foreign
loans up to a cumulative total of one million francs without prior
authorization, but only on condition that the loan did not exceed
two years in duration and the maximum rate of interest did not
exceed four per cent.78 It should be stressed, however, that even loans
which do not cause the borrower's foreign indebtedness to exceed
the two million franc ceiling, will be subject to the declaration procedure if they constitute a direct investment.79

F. Criminal Penalties
Article 5 of the new law provides criminal penalties for violation
of the law, as well as for violation of those decrees issued in conformity with article 3 of the law. The penalties include imprisonment from
one to three months, confiscation of the corpus delicti, and imposition of a fine of at least one-half, but not more than twice, the
amount of the infraction. No other sanctions are provided.
Enforcement of economic regulations by criminal sanctions is
74. These arc established by the Conseil National des Credit and arc obligatory on
banks in France, whether domestic or branches of foreign banks.
75. l\Iany such loans arc financed by French branches of foreign (frequently American) banks. The branch is considered as a French resident for these purposes and it
need in no event request authorization. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, § II, art 6(3),
[1967) J.O. 1023. If such a bank operated as an investment bank, and acquired control
of French companies, however, it would presumably be subject to investment procedures.
76. Id. § IV, art. 6(2).
77. Id. § IV, art. 6(4).
78. Avis No. 762 of the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Aug. 7, 1963,
tit. I, [1963) J.O. 7340, replacing Avis No. 669 of the Ministry of the Economy and of
Finance of Jan. 21, 1959, tit. l(A)(5)(b), [1959) J.O. 1130.
79. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, § IV, art. 6(1), [1967) J.O. 1073,
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not particularly surprising, but the vagueness of the regulatory criteria could well lead to inequities. A leading member of the Paris
bar has commented that the vagueness of such key concepts as "control" abandons the definition to "the discretion of the administration at first and the criminal court afterwards."80 One might guess
that in practice most prudent businessmen will avoid possible criminal penalties by complying with the procedures set forth in the
regulations, as interpreted by the administration in the informal
conferences mentioned above, even in those cases where it is extremely doubtful that a court would find the regulations applicable.
In the absence of judicial interpretation, the interpretation urged
by the administration will be accepted. This was already the established practice under prior law.81
It should be noted that this is not solely a French phenomenon:
distortions in the interpretation of economic regulations brought
about the threat of criminal prosecutions and by the absence of
judicial interpretation in noncriminal cases has been noted and
criticized in regard to the enforcement of American regulatory
legislation.82 The complexity of the regulations under United States
statutes, such as the Export Control Act,83 which are also enforced by
criminal sanctions, has given rise to a similar pattern of informal
consultations with the concerned agency and usual acceptance of its
interpretation.
The provisions for institution of criminal proceedings84 appear
to leave considerable discretion with the Minister of Finance in the
commencement and settlement of actions based on violations of investment controls. Thus, although little flexibility in the prosecution
of criminal violations of the new law is evident from its text, in
practice, such flexibility will probably exist.
G. Industrial Property Rights and Know-How
Control by the Minister of Finance over agreements with foreign
residents relating to industrial property rights, know-how, and technical assistance, traditionally exercised within the scope of exchange
80. Monneray, Le Nouveau Regime des Changes et des Investissements Etrangers,
Le Monde, Feb. 5·6, 1967, at 9, col. 2.
81. Jeantet, Exchange and Control Regulations in France in 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET 197, 224 (E. Stein&: T. Nicholson eds. 1960).
82. Austern, Sanctions in Silhouette: An Inquiry Into the Enforcement of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 51 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 38 (1963).
83. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-32 (1964). The regulations are found at 15 C.F.R. § 368-99
(1967).
84. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, art. 5(ll), [1966] J.O. 11621 (incorporating by
reference provisions of the Customs Code giving the Minister of Finance discretionary
powers in the institution of proceedings).
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controls, was terminated with the abolition of those controls by
Law No. 66-1008. The law made no provision for new controls in
this area. However, a decree transferred responsibility to the Minister of Industry and empowered him to give an avis, or opinion, on
such agreements.85 While this decree was issued on the same day as
the Ministry of Finance decree implementing Law No. 66-1008, it is
not based upon that law and makes no reference to it.86 It differs
in a number of significant ways from the Ministry of Finance regulations.
Unlike the regulations providing for control both over French
investments abroad and foreign investment in France, the Ministry
of Industry decree applies only to the acquisition by French domiciliaries of industrial property rights, know-how, and technical assistance from abroad. The unilateral nature of the control illustrates
a French policy decision that the primary concern of the government
is to protect French industry against such weakening or stagnation of
its technical competence as might arise through excessive reliance
and expenditure on foreign industrial property rights and techniques.
The decree provides that the French domiciliary shall deposit the
proposed agreement, together with a dossier of supporting documents
and explanations, with the Ministry. 87 Within forty days after the
completed dossier has been received, the Ministry must render a
favorable or unfavorable opinion on the agreement. The Ministry's
examination spans the technical and financial terms of the agreement
and takes into account national defense requirements, if applicable.88
It may consult with the contracting party to determine whether
available French resources have been utilized and may propose and
discuss modifications of the agreement. Presumably, it can refuse to
render a favorable opinion if proposed modifications are not accepted.89
Since the Ministry of Industry decree is not based on the new
85. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1081. The decree was later implemented by departmental regulation. Arrete of the Ministry of Industry, March 6,
1967, [1967] J.O. 3173.
86. The only authority cited in the decree is Decree No. 65-586 of July 15, 1965,
[1965] J.O. 6215, relating to the organization of the Ministry of Industry.
87. Unlike Decree No. 67-78, [1967] J.O. 1073, which uses the test of habitual residence, Decree No. 67-82, art. 1, [1967] J.O. 1080, refers to contracts between persons
domiciled in France and persons domiciled abroad. The reason for this differentiation is not apparent.
88. Arrcte of the Ministry of Industry, March 6, 1967, arts. 1, 3, n.64, [1967] J.O.
3173.
89. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2, [1967] J.O. 1081. In the opinion of
one writer the contracting party need only consider the technical suggestions of the
Ministry and is not obliged to accept these or any other modifications. See Pinto, supra
note 68, at 260-61.
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law governing foreign investments, the effect of an unfavorable
opinion rendered by the Ministry is uncertain. It is quite clear that
the criminal penalties of Law No. 66-1008 are not applicable. 0° Furthermore, as the decree itself imposes no penalties, criminal or otherwise, it may be argued that even if the parties disregard the opinion
of the Ministry, the contract would nevertheless remain valid. 91
Notwithstanding this apparent lack of enforcement remedies, the
departmental arrete, issued by the Ministry of Industry on March 6,
1967, to complete the provisions of the January decree, provides that
the decision of the Ministry will be communicated to the ta.x
authorities and to customs authorities.92 This raises the possibility
that indirect pressures may be applied to coerce compliance with
the Ministry's proposals. To pose one possibility, deductions taken
by a licensee for royalty payments under a license which had received
an unfavorable opinion by the Ministry might well be disallowed by
the tax authorities. Thus, while it is doubtful that legal authority
exists for the taking of prejudicial tax or customs action based solely
on the unfavorable opinion of the Ministry regarding a licensing
agreement, it may be expected that the mere expression of an official
opinion as to the undesirability of an agreement, together with the
communication of this opinion to the interested agencies, will dissuade the parties from putting their agreement into effect without
inclusion of the Ministry's "suggestions."
The other principal requirement contained in the Ministry of
Industry decree is that of making annual reports of receipts and
expenses under agreements covered by the decree. 93 Since the only
contracts covered by such agreements are those which would generally call for payments, but not receipts, by the French party, the
reason for requiring the latter in the annual report is unclear. It
seems quite probable that the language was drafted in expectation
that the decree would be bilateral in nature. In fact, a later circular
of the Ministry of Industry, while recognizing that there is no obligation to do so, has requested that contracts transferring or licensing
industrial property rights abroad should likewise be filed with the
Ministry.94 Indeed, the Ministry of Industry has in some cases
formally requested reports as to the receipts by the French contract90. See Monneray, supra note 80, at 12. Professor Pinto is also of the same opinion.
Pinto, supra note 68, at 263.
91. Pinto, supra note 68, at 263.
92. Arrete of the Ministry of Industry, March 6, 1967, art. 6, [1967] J.O. 3173.
93. Decree No. 67-82 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 3, [1967] J.O. 1081; Arrete of the
Ministry of Industry, March 6, 1967, art. 8, [1967] J.O. 3173.
94. Ministry of Industry Circular, April 13, 1967, at 2.
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ing party from foreign licensing agreements, maintaining its request
despite objection by the party. As there would appear to be no present legal basis for such requests, it may be expected that further
regulations will be issued, or that administrative practice will be
conformed to the contents of the present regulations.
IV. THE

NEW LEGAL REGIME OF FRENCH COMPANIES
UNDER FOREIGN CONTROL

The most important novelty in the new foreign investment
regulations is the discriminatory legal treatment of French companies under foreign control. A French company under foreign control
must make a declaration of all intended direct investments in France
and such investments are subject to the refusal of the Ministry of
Finance. Similar investments by French-owned French companies
are, of course, free of such obligations.
Prior law, based as it was on the control of foreign exchange,
imposed barriers only on the original investment from abroad. Once
a subsidiary had been established or control of an existing company
had been acquired by the investment of foreign capital, the subsidiary's subsequent dealings in France were not subject to regulation. A company established under French law and having its head
office in France was considered to be French and was treated as a
resident.!16
The mechanism for applying the new restrictions is found in
article 4(1) of the Ministry of Finance decree, which states that the
declaration procedure is applicable to direct investments made by
companies in France under foreign control ("societes en France sous
controle etranger"). If the framework of the decree and the teaching
of prior exchange control law, both of which are based on the concept of residence, are to be respected, the phrase "foreign control"
must be read to refer to companies in France under control of persons resident abroad. Article 3(l)(b) of the decree, relating to the
corollary situation of investment by French-controlled companies
abroad, more clearly refers to French residence, requiring declaration of direct investments abroad by companies under the control
of persons in France ("sous controle de personnes en France"). Basing
his argument on the difference in language between article 4(1) and
95. Avis No. 619 of Sept. 18, 1956, [1956] J.O. 8817. See also the definition supplied
by the "Office des Changes" in response to a questionnaire: "La legislation des changes
considere comme franraises les societes constitutees suivant la loi franraise et dont le
siege social est situe en France. C'est le critere du siege social qui a ete adopte pour
l'assujetissement a la legislation des changes." J. HAMEL, LE CoNTROLE DES CHANGES
191 (1955).

694

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 66:669

article 3(1)(b), Professor Pinto, in his interesting article on the new
law, has stated that the decree intends to utilize the test of nationality and not of residence in determining what constitutes "foreign
control" of companies in France.96 Such an interpretation would be
inconsistent with the residence test set up by article 4(1) in defining
the flow of foreign capital into first tier investments in France subject to the declaration procedure. Thus, the substitution of a nationality test in determining those second tier investments (investments in France by a foreign-controlled French company) subject
to the declaration procedure does not seem to be required by the
decree's language or its purposes.97
The residence test, which is quite clearly adopted in referring to
direct investments abroad by foreign companies under control of
persons in France, does cause certain anomalies in extreme cases.
Thus, for example, a Delaware corporation mmed by a French citizen resident in the United States would be free to make direct investments in the United States without first making a declaration to the
Ministry of Finance. If, however, the owner resided in France, the
very same investment would be subject to the declaration procedure.
Even more bizarre would be the case of a Delaware corporation
owned by an American citizen resident in France. Following the test
of article 3(l)(b), this American firm would be sous controle de personnes en France and would, consequently, be subject to the declaration procedures even if it made a direct investment in the United
States having no relationship with France-as, for example, the
establishment of a United States subsidiary or branch, or the acquisition of the assets of another United States business. In view of the
seeming lack of French jurisdiction, or legislative interest, in such
exclusively American affairs, it is doubtful whether such a result is
intended.
The practical effect of subjecting French companies under foreign control to the investment regulations is that a foreign-controlled subsidiary may not itself acquire a French company or even
increase its control over its own subsidiary without the blessing of
the Ministry of Finance. Nor may it set up branch offices or acquire
a fonds de commerce, or business concern, without Ministry approval. This prohibition would seem to bring under governmental
control a rather broad range of activities. Any time that a foreigncontrolled French company in a service industry (for example, the

LA

96. Pinto, supra note 68, at 252.
97. Accord R. &: J. LEFEBVRE, LE NOUVEAU REGIME
FRANCE ET L'ETRANGER 12-13 (Mimeo 1967).

DES RELATIONS FINANCIERS ENTRE
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automatic car wash or laundromat industries) wishes to open a new
operation to exploit a new clientele, it appears that a new declaration will have to be made to the Ministry. The same would be true
for the establishment of additional sales points by any sales organization. Finally, the notion of "fonds de commerce" (roughly translated
as a business or "going concern") is sufficiently broad to cause uncertainty as to whether investment regulations apply in a wide variety
of situations, such as the purchase of premises or the purchase of a
commercial lease or assets of another company. The practitioner
faced with the problem of determining whether a particular transaction will be deemed to involve a fonds de commerce for investment
purposes should, perhaps, refer to the definitions of this well-developed concept in French tax law.
Another effect of requiring French subsidiaries to declare direct
investments-in view of the very broad scope of the term-is seemingly to subject self-financed expansion to government control.98
The typical case is where a foreign-controlled French subsidiary
builds a new plant for new activities, raising the money by itself
borrowing from French sources. While the commentators hesitate
to conclude that such a transaction is subject to the control procedures,99 and indeed a close reading of the decree permits the argument that the situation is not covered, 100 indications from informed
sources are that government authorities would subject such expansion activity to control. 101
While the new regulations constitute a profound change in the
treatment of companies owned by foreign capital, the argument that
they further constitute a profound modification of the French theory
of nationality of companies is less supportable.102 While French case
law has flirted from time to time with the notion of control as a test
of nationality,103 the accepted theory is that certain restricted statu98. Brock, supra note 48, at 988.
99. Pinto, supra note 68, at 250.
100. Article 4(1) of Decree No. 67-68, [1967] J.O. 1073, provides that a declaration
must be filed for any direct investment made by foreign residents or by a French
company under foreign control. However, in the case of "extension" art. 2(3)(b)
defines direct investment as: "All other operations which ••• tend to permit one
or several persons • • • to insure the extension of a company already under their
control." (Emphasis added.) It can be argued that in the case of local financing no
declaration need be filed by the foreign parent which has engaged in no investment
activity, nor need it be filed by the subsidiary which has not engaged in an operation
to insure the "extension" of a company already under its control.
101. A specific exception is made in the case of an increase in capital from re•
tained earnings of the French company, which is not subject to declaration. Arrete of
the Ministry of the Economy and of Finance, Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] J.O. 1073.
102. La Claviere, La Nouvelle Reglementation des Relations Financieres avec
l'Entranger, [1967] Sem. Jur. I. 2071, at para. 28.
103. See, e.g., Remington Typewriter, [1936] D.P. I. 121 (Cass. req.).
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tory discriminations against French corporations mvned by foreign
shareholders do not change the French nationality of companies
having their siege in France.104 The new regulations would seem to
conform to this principle. Their main novelty is that in the past special treatment of French corporations controlled by foreign shareholders has either been exceptional (such as the seizure of companies
under enemy control as a war measure), 105 in the nature of denial
of special government benefits,106 or in support of national security;107 the new rules, however, seem to provide for surveillance in
France of French companies controlled by foreign residents as a
permanent measure and as part of a general control of the role of
foreigners in the domestic economy.
V.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW LAWPROCEDURE AND POLICY

A. The Elements of Decision
The preceding study of the new foreign investment law and
regulations leaves little doubt that the structure for rigid control of
foreign direct investment in France now exists. The use the government will make of the available controls is not, however, fully
known. The first indications are, perhaps, contained in the information which the administration demands from foreigners intending
to effect direct investments in France, the information upon which,
presumably, the administration's decision will be based. The suggested contents of the declaration of direct investment are set forth
in a notice issued by the Ministry of Finance.108 While this notice
does not have the force of law, it does represent the point of view of
the governmental agency in charge of foreign investments; consequently, substantial compliance with it is both expected and in the
interest of the potential investor.
104. See H . .BATTIFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 231 (4th ed. 1967).
105. Id. at 228.
106. J.J. Rozendael Co. v. Minister of Public Works, [1933] D.H. Jur. 489 (Cass. civ.)
(government award of war damages).
107. Decree of August 17, 1936, [1936] J.O. 8888 (requiring at least half of the
capital in defense industry corporations to be owned by French nationals); other
legislation provides that the management or board of directors must be French, see
Law of May 31, 1924, [1924] J.O. 5046 (companies engaged in air transportation);
Law of April 7, 1902, art. 7, [1902) J.O. 2626 (subsidies for merchant marine).
108. Ministere de !'Economic et des Finances, Direction du Tresor, Notice relative
aux conditions d'etablissement des declarations prealables d'investissements directs
operes en France par des personnes physiques ou morales a l'etranger ou par des
entreprises ou societes en France sous controle etranger (April 1967), published in REcuEIL pES TEXTES DU MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, INVESTISSEMENT I (1967).
The Notice is accompanied by a printed form upon which the declaration of direct
investment may be made.
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The first category of information concerns the investor himself.
Nationality of an individual investor must be specified. For a corporation, not only is the address of the head office demanded, but
also the identity of its principal shareholders and their respective
percentage shares of ownership of the company. The administration
thus is interested less in the legal nationality of a corporation than
in the nationality of the controlling shareholders. Certainly an investment made by the Belgian subsidiary of an American company
will be considered as an American, and not a Belgian, investment.
Financial information as to the investing corporation must also be
made known, including its stated capital and its annual financial
statements for the past three years. I£ the company is itself a subsidiary or part of a related group of companies, some information
as to the related companies is also required. Finally, technical and
trade information regarding the investor must be supplied: the nature of its activities, its volume of trade by product, its investment
in plant and equipment, and its distribution arrangements. As a
practical matter, it is frequently best to supplement this information
by attaching examples of technical brochures which describe in detail the investor's products.
The second category of information concerns the French company in which the direct investment is to be made, and serves clearly
to identify this entity, its legal form and its address, as well as its
principal managers.
In the third category, the investor is required to describe the
nature of the contemplated investment. Where capital is to be subscribed in kind rather than in cash or where a direct investment109
is to be made by a financial transaction other than purchase of a
capital interest, full disclosure of the transaction and the nature of
the contribution is necessary. The total amount of the investment as
well as the timetable for its full realization must be supplied. Most
important, the distribution of the capital contribution between foreign and French shareholders must be set forth in full detail.
The required information differs somewhat depending upon
whether investment in an existing company or the creation of a new
company is contemplated. In the former situation, the investor must
supply the company's articles of incorporation and bylaws, a list of
its shareholders (insofar as possible), an indication of its stated capital, and its financial statements for the previous three years, as well
109. Direct investments, as described in the Notice (note 108 supra), may include:
loans or guarantees of loans, purchase of debt instruments of all kinds, acquisition of
rights in real property or of mining rights, technical or commercial assistance contracts, and patent and trademark licenses.
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as a statement and justification of the purchase price per share. The
latter situation requires submission of the proposed articles of incorporation and bylaws, as well as a financial plan breaking down
into various categories (incorporation expenses, real estate, plant,
equipment, housing, and so forth) the capital to be invested and the
proposed method of realization of this investment. In both cases, a
proposed financial plan for the next four years must be supplied,
indicating the relation of debt to equity and whether the financing
is to be obtained in France or abroad.
The fourth category is entitled "motives and effects of the
planned investment,"110 and the information demanded here is apparently intended to aid economic planners in predicting the longrange effect of the investment on France's economy. Two issues stand
out: the contribution to France's technical development and the
effect of the investment on its balance of payments.
The investor is required to analyze and describe its plans for
production in France, including the nature of goods to be produced,
the volume and value of production, the type of plant to be acquired
or built, and the equipment to be utilized. In particular, the declaration should state "if the project involves the creation of a center
of technical research."111 If so, details as to its proposed operations
should be set out.
In order to show the effect on the balance of payments, the declaration should describe the equipment to be imported, its price, and
terms of payment. An estimate must be made of export production
and export destinations and the declaration must indicate "if certain
countries or certain zones will be contractually excluded from the
market for the production of the French enterprise or company, or
if certain countries or certain zones will, on the contrary, be reserved
to it, or if no agreements of this nature are foreseen between the
French company and its foreign shareholders or other companies of
the same group."112 Finally, proposed commercial agreements benv-een the foreign shareholder and the French company must be set
forth.
When the declaration of direct investment has been made according to the strictures of the administration, the elements for decision
are assembled.
B. The Procedure of Decision
The Ministry of Finance, which is granted the power to veto
foreign loans and direct investment, is divided into four depart110. Notice, supra note 108, at 8.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id.
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ments: budget, taxes, economy, and treasury. The Department of
the Treasury (Direction du Tresor) has been assigned the duty of
processing declarations of direct investments and applications for
approval of foreign loans.113 The Minister of Finance himself, however, has the ultimate responsibility for decision and, in important
cases, may consider the proposed investment personally. He is aided
by the Interministerial Committee on Foreign Investment (Le Comite lnterministeriel des lnvestissements Etrangers) over which he
presides.114 The thirteen other members of the Committee are a
cross section of the government and represent the various interests
which may be affected by foreign investments.115 The most important
members of the Committee, in reference to particular investment
applications, are the Minister of Industry and the Delegate for Regional Planning, since the agencies which they represent are vitally
concerned with the effect of new investments. The Interministerial
Committee not only studies the general problems of French investment abroad and foreign investment in France, but also gives its
opinion on particular projects which "present an exceptional importance because of their amount and characteristics." 116 In practice it
considers all investments amounting to more than 500,000 francs.117
Even if the investment is not presented to the Interministerial
Committee, it is the internal procedure of the Ministry of Finance
to refer specific investment projects to those ministries representing
interests which may be affected. Thus, all applications of any significance are subjected to the scrutiny of departments other than the
Ministry of Finance. A declaration of a proposed investment which
will result either in the acquisition of control of an existing French
company, or in the establishment of a new one, will ordinarily be
113. Arrete of Jan. 27, 1967, arts. 3, 7, [1967] J.O. 1074.
114. The committee as presently constituted was created under the prior exchange
control regime in 1966 as a successor to a similar committee in existence since 1945.
Arrete of May 4, 1966, [1966] J.O. 3605, as modified by Arrete of June 14, 1966, [1966]
J.O. 5012. While the committee is not mentioned in the new law and regulations, it
in fact continues to operate as in the past.
115. The members are the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Equipment, the Minister of Industry (who exercises functions comparable to those of the United States Secretary of Commerce), the
Minister of Social Affairs (including labor and public health), the Minister in charge
of Scientific Research, Atomic Energy and Space, the Secretary of State for Foreign
Commerce, the Secretary General for National Defense, the Secretary General of the
Inter-Departmental Committee for Questions Relating to European Economic Cooperation, the Commissioner in charge of the Economic Plan, the Delegate for Regional
Planning ("le dt!legut! l'amt!nagement du territoire et l'action rt!gionale''), and the
Governor of the Bank of France.
116. Arrete of May 4, 1966, art. 2, [1966] J.O. 3605.
117. MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE, RAPPORT SUR LES !NVESTISSEMENT ETRANGERS DANS
L'lNDUSTRIES FRANgAISES (Bockanowski Report) 14 (1965); [1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports
du Conseil Economique et Social) 377, 386 (May 28, 1966).
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referred by the Ministry of Finance (Treasury Department) to the
technical staff of the Ministry of Industry. After analyzing the effect
of the investment on French industry, this staff will then give its
opinion, which will be relayed in turn to the Ministry of Finance.
Similarly, where a new plant is to be built, the advice of the Regional
Planning Department will be sought. The proposed location of the
plant site will be considered in relation to the government's goal of
decentralization and creation of new industry in regions of France
which have traditionally been underdeveloped and which have not
shared in France's current prosperity.
As the declaration is processed by the various technical services,
it is possible, especially in cases involving difficult issues, that the
applicant will be called upon by the interested service to supply further information, or to explain its position. Although the purpose of
these meetings or communications with the ministries involved may
frequently be simply to obtain informal clarification as to the details
of the investment, in some cases the ministries may ask for amendments of the planned investment so as to bring it more in line with
government goals. Where conflict exists among various ministries,118
modification of the application to meet the objections of an intransigent department may bring about harmony and approval. Concessions which might be requested could include, for example, renunciation of rights to certain government subsidies ordinarily accorded
to investments119 meeting criteria set forth in the government's economic program (le Plan). 120
If the processing is not completed within the sixty-day limit provided by the decree, 121 the Ministry will demand a postponement
(ajournement) of the investment. Its letter will, however, stipulate
that the postponement is only provisional and is intended to permit
the various services to have time to process the declaration. Thus,
administrative practice has, in fact, turned the sixty-day limit of the
decree, which at first view seems to be a rigid statute of limitations,
118. It is not infrequent that the interest of different ministries are in conflict.
For example, Regional Planning might welcome a new investment which plans to locate in Brittany, which is industrially underdeveloped, but the Ministry of Industry
might fear the impact of a highly developed industry in a field where the entry of
new competitors may adversely affect budding French development.
119. In principle, the laws granting special benefits do not discriminate against
foreign-controlled corporations, and in the past such corporations have profited from
subsidies and special loans. See J. GERVAIS, LA FRANCE FACE AUX !NVESTISSEMENTS
ETRANGERS 46-47 (1963).
120. The Plan is a comprehensive set of economic goals for France, which, not
having the force of law, is to be attained by voluntary and quasi-voluntary measures
in addition to economic incentives. The Fifth Plan covers the period 1966-1970.
121. Decree No. 67-78 of Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), [1967] J.O. 1073.
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into a statement of principle from which derogations may now be
made at will.
When the Ministry has arrived at a final decision, it will either
request the permanent postponement of the investment or will notify the applicant, in a document that has all the attributes of an
authorization, that in the circumstances of the investment as set forth
the Minister does not choose to exercise his right to demand postponement. Interestingly enough the decree makes no provision for
such a document. It only provides that the Minister may, within
two months of the declaration, request the postponement of the investment, and that he may, in any event, renounce such right prior
to the expiration of the two-month period. 122 Since the Minister's
authorization letter often will list the conditions upon which are
predicated his agreement not to request postponement of the investment, simple administrative practice is again seen to extend the
government powers beyond the scope apparently envisioned by the
enabling law. It should be borne in mind that if the investment
were subsequently to be effectuated in a manner not contemplated
by the Minister's renunciation letter, it could be argued that the
investment realized had not been properly declared to the authorities and was thus in violation of foreign investment controls. The
Minister's letter thus very closely resembles the authorization letters
issued by the Ministry of Finance under the license procedures of
wartime and postwar exchange controls, under which all unlicensed
transfers or investments were forbidden.
The use of the renunciation letter as a kind of license is indicative of the attitude of the civil servants who are entrusted with the
execution of foreign investment controls. Each proposed substantial
foreign investment is treated as a case for full study as to its desirability and effect on the French economy. The winds of change of
the Law of December 28-"financial relations between France and
other countries are free"-have not swept through the halls of rue
de Rivoli and rue Clichy, where the administration continues its
study and careful control of foreign investments.
C. The Government's Policy and Its Background
In order to understand the various actions which may be taken
by the government on investment declarations submitted to it under
the new regime, it is necessary to consider the recent history of the
control of foreign investment. In a country known for its emphasis
122. Id.
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on theory and abstraction, it is remarkable that the French government has never published criteria by which direct investment applications would be judged. Such a failure was perhaps understandable
under the administration of the law in the postwar period: in March
1963 the Ministry of Finance stated that no foreign investment application had been refused in recent years, 123 and this situation continued substantially unchanged through mid-1964.124 But from this
period through 1965, an abrupt shift of emphasis occurred and indefinite delays in processing applications became almost routine.
While actual denials of investment applications were exceptional,
considerable pressure was put on applicants either voluntarily to
withdraw applications for investments deemed unsuitable, or to transmute the proposed investment into a more suitable form. Even so,
one author claims that from January to September 1965, 47 out of
138 investment applications were denied outright by the Ministry
of Finance.125
During this difficult period for foreign investment, it became
known that the Ministry was formulating guidelines which would
be the "bible" for foreigners seeking to invest in France. These
guidelines, however, never appeared. Among the probably numerous reasons for this failure, the two principal ones seem to have been
changing governmental attitudes toward the dangers of foreign investment, and internal disputes among the concerned agencies as to
criteria for desirable investments.126
The first reaction to the ever-increasing volume of foreign investments was thus simply to hinder and delay all substantial (and some
not so substantial) investments, in the hopes that investors would
become discouraged. Instructions went out from the Minister of
Finance to his services to examine each investment application with
great care and to make a choice between "good" and "bad" investments.127 This resulted, in 1965, in a very substantial drop in foreign,
123. See GERVAIS, supra note 119, at 39.
124. For a history of this early period see Dusart, The Impact of the French Government on American Investment in France, 7 HARV. INT'L L. Cum J. 75 (1965).
125. L. l\1ANUALI, LA FRANCE A L'IMPLANTATION ETRANGERE 42 (1967). See also Le
Monde, Sept. 16, 1965, at 19, col. I. Just as the Ministry's statement that as of March
1963 no investment application had been rejected is a bit suspect due to unofficial
methods of frustrating investment applications, it may also be wondered whether a
number of these forty-seven refusals were not later tempered by authorization of subsequently modified applications.
126. In fact, during this period the only two previously enunciated general theories of investment control-favoring investment in new companies over takeovers and
determining favorable and unfavorable sectors of the economy for foreign investment
-were abandoned as unworkable. (1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social') 377, 395 (May 28, 1966).
127. Le Figaro, Feb. 3, 1966, at 17, col. 2.
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and particularly American, investments,128 which was followed by an
even steeper drop in 1966, when the full effect of corporate investment decisions made in 1964 and 1965 was felt. 129 But it soon became apparent that since the foreign investors were perfectly free to
establish in a Common Market neighbor and export their products
into France, the policy of careful sifting combined with a policy of
undiscriminating delay was an ineffective long-range solution to the
problem. In fact, during this period American investment in Germany and particularly in Belgium showed a marked increase.130
The search for a new policy may be said to date from the replacement, in January 1966, of Valery Giscard d'Estaing by Michel Debre
as Minister of Finance. Debre was responsible for the creation of the
Interministerial Investment Committee which was to aid in fornmlating a policy as to the categories of investments to be limited. It
was indicated that the task of the committee was to create "jurisprudence," or case law, rather than "doctrine," or textbook policy.131
According to the Ministry of Finance, the policy was to embody a
presumption that foreign investments would be allowed unless they
adversely affected a sensitive national interest. 132 The Minister of
Finance has repeated, on several occasions, his reference to the presumption in favor of foreign-including American-investment.133
And, ever since the extraordinary public announcement by the Ministry on March 24, 1966, that Motorola, a United States corporation,
had been authorized to set up a plant in Toulouse for the manufacture of semi-conductors-no announcement of investment authorization is ordinarily given-the approach has been to study foreign investment applications on a case-by-case basis in the light of this favorable presumption.
Action on investment applications is taken within the context of
French economic and political goals. Foreign investment in general
presents several possible economic advantages: especially in view of
the slump in domestic investment, 134 foreign investment in plant and
128. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 34 (Sept. 1966).
129. See MINISTERE DE L'ECONOMIE ET DES FINANCES, BALANCE DES PAIEMENTS DE
L'ANNEE 1966 auiy 1967): U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 128, at 42 (Sept.
1967). See also report of the Minister of Finance to the Comitt! Interministeriel des
Investissements Etrangers, Le Monde, Sept. 21, 1967, at 21, col. 1.
130. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 128, at 12 (Sept. 1967).
131. Mooney, Investments in France, New York Times (International ed.), March 24,
1966, at 1, col. 3.
132. Le Monde, Feb. 18, 1966, at 1, col. 5 (statement attributed to Debre).
133. Speech of Minister Debre to the French Chamber of Commerce in the United
States, Paris-Presse-L'Intransigeant-France-Soir, June 24, 1967, at 5, col. 3; Address
Before National Assembly, International Herald Tribune, June 30, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
134. MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE, supra note 117, at 2 (increase in investments of 12%
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equipment aids in stimulating industrial expansion, compet1t1on,
and increased employment; foreign investment also improves the
commercial balance of payments position, by replacing imports with
national production, and furthers French technology through contributions of sophisticated foreign equipment and know-how. Furthermore, the continued surplus of private foreign investment in France
over such French investment abroad has in recent years more than
covered a persistent balance of payments deficit in the public sector,
thus engendering a favorable over-all balance of payments. 135
However, certain investments present various economic disadvantages which may outweigh such benefits. Among these is the
possible domination of a sector of the economy by a giant industrial
concern, leading to monopolization and solidification of the price
structure rather than to an increase in price competition. More
likely is the risk that a foreign-controlled company will fail to respect
norms of the Economic Plan. Inflationary pressures may result both
from new investments and subsequent financing which, if from foreign sources, may circumvent rigid French credit controls. Also, in
some circumstances, foreign investment may even affect adversely the
French balance of payments: companies falling under foreign control may increase importations from the foreign parent; payments of
royalties and fees for use of foreign industrial property and technical
assistance may increase; and the long-term balance of payments may
eventually be affected as successful investments begin to pay dividends abroad.
On the political level, the balance is likely to be equally as difficult to draw. There is, of course, a natural resistance against allowing any sector of the economy important to national security and
welfare, in their broadest terms, to be dominated by foreign interests.
Moreover, as reliance on foreign technology, research, and development is thought to lead to foreign economic domination, the government scrutinizes most carefully applications for investments in industries where new technology and research is of high importance;
indeed, authorization may be conditioned upon the research and development taking place in France. Also, there is a fear that practices
of foreign-controlled companies in dealing with labor may violate
French traditions, particularly in decisions to shut down temporarily
or permanently an unprofitable plant. And, whether because of posin 1960 fell to an increase of 2.4% in 1964, much less than the increase of national
production).
135. MINISTERE

DE L'EcoNOMIE ET DES FINANCES,

supra note 129; see also

LEs !NVESTISSEMENTS ETRANGERS EN FRANCE 28 (1966).

E. SCHMILL,
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sible limitation of export trade by a foreign govemment186 or because
of a desire that important decisions regarding French companies be
made in France by Frenchmen pursuant to French practices,137 there
undoubtedly exists generally a diffuse fear of foreign-controlled companies,138 most recently crystallized in criticisms of the mainmise, or
takeover, of French industry by Americans.139 Despite these political
fears, however, there are still those in France who see some benefit
in the importation of new business ideas and policies from the New
World. 140 It has even been stated that if American investment in
France had no other justification, the contribution it has made to
consistency in accounting and full disclosure to fiscal authorities and
shareholders is a welcome innovation to the French economy and
one which no doubt have a widespread beneficial effect.
The new investment controls certainly give the French government the tools for dealing with the problems posed by foreign investment. While the tools are new, however, the problems are not,
and it is probable that, in the absence of any new decisional guidelines in either the new law or regulations, the policies above described, which may be gleaned from case-by-case studies over the
years, will continue to be applied.
In the vast majority of cases under the new law, authorization to
make the proposed investment will, after careful study, be granted,
either in its original form or as modified to meet administration
objections. The conclusion by the administration that a particular
136. Notably the United States government in applying the prohibitions of the
Trading with the Enemy Act to prevent trade by French subsidiaries with Communist
China. This limitation led to private litigation in one case in which minority shareholders of an American controlled corporation successfully prevented the majority
shareholders from causing the French subsidiary to break its contract for delivery of
manufactured products to Communist China. Ste Fruehauf v. Massardy, [1965] Sem.
Jur. II. 14274 bis (Cour d'appel, Paris). This decision was followed by an exchange of
diplomatic notes instituted by the government of France, which remain unpublished.
The French government was presumably critical of the United States government's
extraterritorial application of its regulatory legislation to French corporations. According to one author the example of the Fruehauf case was one of the principal
reasons for the increased vigor of investment screening in 1965 and 1966. Y. Loussouarn,
Le Regime ]uridique des Investissements Etrangers en France, in ETUDES DE DROIT
CoNTEMPORAIN (Report of the Seventh International Congress of Comparative Law,
Uppsala, 1966).
137. See address of Minister Debre to Paris meeting of French Chamber of Commerce in the United States. International Herald Tribune, June 23, 1967, at 1, col. 7.
138. For a good review of the political problems of American direct investment
abroad, see Model, The Politics of Private Foreign Investment, 45 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Q.
639-51 (1967).
139. Press Conference of General de Gaulle. Le Monde, Nov. 29, 1967, at 2, col. 4.
(The criticism was based on an argument that direct investment from American
sources in view of the continued deficit in the United States balance of payments was
made with "inflated" dollars.)
140. See, e.g., J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, LE DEFI AMERl:CAIN (1967).

Michigan Law Review

706

[Vol. 66:669

investment presents net economic and political disadvantages will
result in disapproval only in aggravated cases. But the fact remains
that every proposed investment will be evaluated under the structure and procedures of the new law, and, in particular cases, certain
applications may be denied. The question must be asked whether
such procedures and actions are consistent with France's treaty obligations.
VI.

CONTROL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FRANCE'S
TREATY OBLIGATIONS

The freedom of France to restrict and control foreign investment
may be limited either by its bilateral treaties of establishment with
other nations, of which the Franco-American Convention of Establishment is an example,141 or by the Treaty of Rome, the multilateral
treaty establishing the Common Market. The supremacy of treaty
provisions over any inconsistent provision of domestic law is not only
recognized by the French Constitution, but also is specifically repeated in Law No. 66-1008 itself. 142 We will first examine whether
the new foreign investment controls are compatible with each of
these treaties and then discuss whether the treaty provisions can
serve as a means to eliminate the screening of foreign investments
and to review refusals of permission to invest.

A. The Franco-American Convention of Establishment
Article 5 of this treaty provides for national treatment for
American investors in the following language:
I. Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party
shall be accorded national treatment with respect to engaging in all
types of commercial, industrial, financial and other activities for
gain within the territories of the other High Contracting Party .••.
Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be permitted within
such territories:
(b) to organize companies under the general company laws of
such other High Contracting Party, and to acquire majority interests
in companies of such other High Contracting Party;
(c) to control and manage the enterprises which they have established or acquired.
Moreover, the enterprises which they control ... shall in all that
relates to the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded treatment
141. [1960) 2 U.S.T. 2398; [1960) J.O. 11220.
142. Law No. 66-1008 of Dec. 28, 1966, art. 1, [1966) J.O. 11622.

February 1968]

Foreign Investment in France

707

no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises controlled by
nationals and companies of such other High Contracting Party.

The treaty provisions are quite clearly drafted to protect capital
exportation-to protect, that is, the rights of establishment and investment.143 The broad scope of this protection would seem, on its
face, to be inconsistent with the two key provisions of the new law
on foreign investment-the right of the government to veto new
American direct investments and the new provisions which subject
French corporations, owned by Americans, to declaration procedures
(and possible veto of expansion or direct investment plans) to which
other French corporations are not subjected.
Other articles of the treaty, however, establish exceptions to the
general principle of national treatment. The treaty was signed in
1959 in the knowledge that France had a full-fledged system of exchange controls. Such exchange controls were, moreover, consistent
with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund,
of which both parties were signatories.144 Thus, article X of the
Franco-American Treaty recognizes the problem of exchange controls; it provides in paragraph (I) for national treatment as to currency transfers, and, in the succeeding paragraph, limits each party's
right to impose exchange controls "to the extent necessary to prevent its monetary reserves from falling to a very low level or to effect a moderate increase in very low monetary reserves." 145 According to article X(3), the two parties, "recognizing that the freedom of
movement of investment capital and of the returns thereon would
be conducive to the reallegation of the objectives of the present
Convention, are agreed that such movements shall not be unnecessarily hampered." Each party was to "make every effort to accord,
in the greatest possible measure, to nationals and companies of the
other High Contracting Party the opportunity to make investments
...." (Emphasis added.) And, in addition, each nation was permitted by article 14 of the treaty's protocol to "subject to authorization" the making of investments by foreign nationals and companies "with a view to protecting its currency or facilitating the
143. Thus, there is no specific language to protect the rights of a party to receive
investment from the other contracting party. Accordingly, exchange controls to prevent the flight of capital, as in the case of the newly imposed United States regulations on capital transfers abroad (see text accompanying note 176 infra) are not specifically forbidden.
144. 60 Stat. 1440 (1945).
145. For the view that the decision of a government to impose exchange controls
based on low reserves may be attacked as a violation of treaty provisions only if "the
judgment is obviously unreasonable or in bad faith," see Metzger, Exchange Controls
in International Law, 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 311.
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servicing of the proceeds of investments and the repatriation of
capital."
- While this is hardly a ringing declaration of an absolute right to
invest in all circumstances, it is nevertheless questionable whether
the treaty's derogations from national treatment for investment,
added to permit the continuance of exchange controls then needed
to prevent France's monetary reserves "from falling to a very low
level," may be used as a justification for control of foreign invest•
ment today, in the light of strong monetary reserves and the aboli•
tion of exchange controls. Even more pointed is the absence of any
monetary justification for regulating the activities of Americancontrolled French companies, which are to receive national treatment under the treaty, but which are singled out for special treatment by the foreign investment controls.
Another escape clause from the national treatment principle of
the treaty may be found in the provision of article XII(d) that "the
provisions of the present Convention shall not preclude the application of measures . . . necessary . . . to protect its essential security
interests." But this must be read in the context of the rest of article
XII, the subject matter of which is national freedom to regulate
questions of traffic in arms and radioactive materials, and to restore
peace and security. It is thus highly doubtful that article XII(d) was
intended to serve as the basis for an entire system of economic regulation.
The probable French answer to these somewhat legalistic arguments would be one of confession and avoidance. The real point,
they would maintain (as indeed the French Conseil Economique et
Social has), 148 is that the treaty merely "lays down the principle" of
equality of investment opportunity. The very general terms of the
treaty were not, it would be claimed, intended to be rigorously applied to specific cases; like so many treaty provisions, they were to
have the character of exhortation alone, to be resorted to by a rejected investor only in the event of clear bad faith.
An advocate of the French position could even draw an analogy
between the national treatment and nondiscrimination provisions of
the convention and the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. The fourteenth amendment, of course, does not proscribe
mere differentials in treatment among persons; it is only when such
differentials are seen as irrational or irrelevant in terms of legitimate
146. [1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social) 11 (May 28,
1966).
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national goals that they are struck down.147 Thus it may be argued
that the treaty lays down the principle of equality of investment
opportunity in the same sense that the fourteenth amendment establishes the principle of equal protection, a principle subject to adaptation in the light of the needs and the lawful purposes of the nation.
The application of this principle must be measured both against
the procedures set up for foreign investment authorizations and the
implicitly reserved power of the government to veto undesirable
investments.
The French government has consistently taken the position that
it has the power, before permitting foreigners to exercise their treaty
rights, to subject them to application and licensing procedures. Thus
foreign nationals (including Americans) 148 enjoying the treaty right
to engage in business in France may nonetheless be required to
obtain a carte de commerfant before engaging in business. Such a
requirement, the government has stated, does not affect the "enjoyment" of the rights granted by the convention, but only "the
condition of the exercise of these rights." 149
The contention that the enjoyment of substantive treaty rights
may be conditioned upon the fulfillment of elaborate procedural
prerequisites is difficult to defend. Even in the carte de commerfant
cases-where one may concede as consistent with the treaty the reservation by the state of some police powers to verify the entry and
activities of aliens150-French courts have found the government's
distinction tenuous, and decisions by courts which have considered
the issue on the merits may be found both sanctioning and disapproving the government's procedures. 151 The application of declara147. Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341
(1949).
148. Ministerial response to a written question in parliament, stating that American citizens are required to obtain a carte de commerfant prior to engaging in business in France despite the terms of the Treaty of Establishment. Rep. Min. No. 9258,
[1961] J.O. (Dt!bats Parlemen. de l'Assemblt!e Nationale) 401.
149. Letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 1957, [1957] J.O. 5235 (interpreting Franco-Spanish Treaty to permit France to require carte de commerfant
for Spanish citizens engaging in business in France).
150. Compare the requirements of § 221 of the United States Immigration and
Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964). For an example of limitations of the police
powers under the Rome Treaty, see note 159 infra.
151. Compare Coll, [1952] Gaz. du Pal. I 366 (Cour d'Appel de Paris); Sanchez,
[1952] Gaz. du Pal. I 142 (Cour d'Appel de Lyon), rev'd, [1953] D. Jur. 365 (Cass. crim.);
Cot-Riera, [1953] Sem. Jur. II 7379 (Cour d'Appel de Riom); Bruni and Galtier, [1953]
D. Jur. 425 (Cass. crim.). More recently, however, the criminal chamber of France's
highest court has found that it was bound by a theory of separation of powers to
accept the executive department's interpretation of applicable treaty limitations and
accordingly has determined that the exercise of commerce by persons not having ob•
tained a carte de commerfant constitutes a criminal offense despite the fact that the
defendants were entitled to national treatment. See cases cited in note 169 infra.
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tion and control procedures to Americans of investing in France
raises more serious treaty questions, as the police power rationale
implicit in the carte de commerfant cases has greatly diminished
application when the issue is the entry of capital rather the entry
and establishment of persons. The extension of these declaration
procedures to the economic activities of French companies controlled
by foreign shareholders seems even more clearly to conflict with
treaty principles, for such companies have French nationality under
French internal law152 and article V of the treaty clearly provides
that French companies controlled by Americans shall be accorded
treatment "no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises"
controlled by French citizens. Thus, in both situations above discussed it is arguable that the imposition of the declaration requirements, even if those procedures were intended only to verify the
origin and nature of the investment, is contrary to the treaty.
Even if the validity of the procedural requirements, standing
alone, is assumed, the treaty issue is most clearly posed by the power
that the new legislation seems to give to the Minister of Finance to
veto foreign investments at will and upon grounds limited only by
his own discretion. May an investment by American citizens, or by
French companies controlled by Americans, be "postponed" forever
simply because the government finds it undesirable? Such a result is
difficult to admit if establishment treaties are considered to create
effectively binding obligations, a concept which France has not denied in the past. In an important case decided by the Conseil
d'Etat, 153 it was held that while the French government could require a Swiss citizen, entitled to national treatment under the
Franco-Swiss Treaty of Establishment, to obtain a carte de commerfant before being authorized to sell liquor in France, it could not
refuse to grant such a card, even though French internal law forbade
foreigners to engage in such activities. The legislation, it was held,
could not have been intended to infringe upon a vested treaty right
to national treatment.1154 The treaty rights here in question do not
seem any less worthy of protection.
The official French position on the relationship between the investment controls established by French law and the Franco-Ameri152. Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, art. 3, (1966] J.O. 6402. See also text accompanying notes 102-07 infra.
153. Hurni, [1965] Sem. Jur. II. 14172 bis (Conseil d'Etat).
154. This is the traditional French judicial interpretation, which avoids conflict
between a treaty and a law, and gives, when possible, predominant effect to the treaty.
See H. BATTIFFOL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 41 (4th ed. 1967).
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can and similar treaties of establishment is not yet known. Such an
official interpretation could only be given by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs upon the request of a tribunal before which the issue had
actually been presented. However, the drafting of the foreign investment law and regulations displays a desire to avoid a head-on conflict;
not only does the law expressly state that it is subject to the obligations of international treaties, it also avoids granting a direct veto
power to the government, by the proviso that it may only "postpone"
an undesirable foreign investment. In this way outright conflict between the terms of the treaty and the provisions of the law and
regulations is avoided. The French government thus preserves an
almost complete freedom of action for its future official interpretation of the treaty on a case-by-case basis. However, because of the
nature of the investment rights to be protected and the procedural
difficulties in enforcing bilateral treaty provisions, it may be doubted
that the executive branch of the French goverment will be called
upon to give its official views as to the compatibility of certain provisions of the foreign investment controls with the treaty. To the
extent that treaty provisions of any kind may be brought to bear on
the French regulations, it is probable that, whenever possible, the
Treaty of Rome, with its more explicit obligations and multinational procedures, will be relied upon in lieu of bilateral treaties.

B. The Treaty of Rome
The potential American investor in France may well look for
protection to the Treaty of Rome, the progenitor of the European
Economic Community. Various articles of this treaty look toward
the gradual formation of a unified European capital market: article
7 lays down the broad principle that, subject to more specific provisions, "any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited"; 11515 under article 52, restrictions on freedom of establishment-notably on the right of nationals of member states "to
set up and manage undertakings"-"shall be abolished by progressive stages." Article 67, dealing specifically with restrictions on exchange and investment, provides:
During the transitional period, Member States shall, in so far as may
be necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the Common Mar155. Despite qualifying language ("within the field of application of this Treaty")
art. 7 might be read to reach all foreign nationals, not merely nationals of Common
Market states; in light of what follows, however, it is most unlikely that this was the
intended meaning. See also art. 68(2).
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ket, progressively abolish between themselves restrictions on the
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member States
and any discrimination based on the nationality or the place of residence of the parties or on the place where such capital is invested.
The directives of the Council of Ministers implementing article 67
have clarified and strengthened its rather vague import: as of 1960,
for example, member states were to "grant all exchange authorizations required for the completion or execution" of direct investments156 and to "grant general authorizations" for the acquisition
of securities traded on the stock exchange; as to securities not so
traded, existing "exchange restrictions on capital movements" might
be maintained "if the freedom of these capital movements is of such
a nature as to create an obstacle to the realization of the objectives
of the economic policy of a Member State .... " 157 Existing exchange
restrictions on "the issuance and sale of securities of a domestic enterprise on a foreign capital market" are also permitted, subject to
the same condition; however, a proposed directive submitted by the
Common Market Commission to the Council on February 7, 1967,
would require exchange authorizations to be granted for such transactions.158 And finally, article 221 of the treaty serves as the keystone
of the policy of nondiscrimination: within three years after the
treaty's effective date, "without prejudice to the other provisions"
of the treaty, member si:ates were to allow the nationals of other
member states "to participate financially in the capital of firms or
companies ... in the same manner as their own nationals." 159
Deputies in the European Parliament have already questioned
whether the new French regulations are not incompatible with these
articles of the Rome Treaty160 and a formal response by the Commission is awaited. Nor is the French government itself unaware of
the potential combined effect of these provisions; the Conseil Eco156. "Excepting purely financial investments made only in order to afford the investor indirect access to the monetary or financial market of another country, through
the establishment of or participation in an enterprise situated in such country. Annex
I, list A to First and Second Directives for the Implementation of Treaty Article 67.
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
1651-67 (May 11, 1960).
157. First and Second Directives for the Implementation of Treaty art. 67, 1 CCH
CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r,r 1651-67 (May 11, 1960).
158. Id. ,I 1676.
159. The potential loophole of art. 56, authorizing "special treatment for foreign
nationals on the grounds of public policy, public security and public health," has
been narrowed by a Counsel directive, restricting the invocation of the article to
measures based on the personal conduct of the individual concerned rather than for
economic ends. 1 CCH CoID.I. MKT. REP. ,r 1412.15 (Feb. 25, 1964).
· 160. See [1967] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COID.IUNAUTES EUROPEENES 1652 (question
ecrite No. 1/67, March 15, 1967). See also id. at 1022 (question ecrite No. 152, Feb. 22,
1967).

,rn
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nomique et Social has gone so far as to say that the treaty "renders
impossible . . . any limitation of investments made by nationals
[ressortissants] of other member states . . . even if they are effectively under the control of a national of a third country." 161 In order
to determine whether the treaty may plausibly be invoked by Americans seeking to invest in France, it must be asked whether this assessment by the Conseil Economique et Social is to be taken at face
value: may, for example, Belgian corporations owned and controlled
by Americans profit from the provisions of the treaty to the same
extent as wholly Belgian companies? And even if so, is the French
requirement of authorization prior to investment in fact incompatible with the treaty?
The treaty itself indicates that in certain cases capital originating outside the Community-which could include American capital
-is to be assimilated into Community investment: under article 58,
companies "formed in accordance with the law of a Member State
and having their registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the Community" are to be treated as "nationals" of that member state. In order for a corporation to benefit
from the directives on freedom of establishment, the Council has
further required that it "show an effective and continuous link with
the economy of a Member State" but has specifically excluded dependence on the nationality of managers or stockholders as a criterion upon which this determination could be based; 162 since article 67 protects "residents" as well as "nationals," substantial business "links," even ·without incorporation in a member state, would
presumably suffice to invoke that article. 163 Therefore, a Belgian
corporation, by whomever controlled, doing business in Belgium
and not formed merely for the purpose of investing in France, should
be able to claim the protection of the treaty. That a corporation
organized under Belgian law would be attributed Belgian "nationality" for purposes of diplomatic protection is, in addition, a wellaccepted proposition of international law. 164
161. (1966] J.O. (Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique et Social) 377, 383
(May 28, 1966) (emphasis added).
162. General Program for the Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom of Establishment, 1 CCH Co~n.r. MKT. REP. ,r,r 1335, 1336 (1961). See also U. EVERLING, THE
RIGHT OF EsTABUSHMENT IN THE CommN MARKET 74-77 (1964).
163. Cf. 1 CCH C<>MM. MKT. REP. 1f 1602.13; EVERLING, supra note 162, at 76-77.
164. See In re Mexico Plantagen G.m.b.H., [1931-1932] Ann. Dig. (No. 135) (German-Mexican Claims Comm. 1930); C. HYDE, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw 902-03 (2d rev. ed.
1945); RE5TATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§§ 27, 172-73 (1965).
Note that this American recourse to foreign incorporation might also be possible
under establishment treaties similar to that between France and the Togolese Repub-
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Whether corporations under the protection of the treaty may
nevertheless be obliged to obtain at least the authorization of a state
before engaging in investment activities is a more difficult question.
The rules of the Community in analogous areas present no clear
picture. In implementing article 48 of the treaty providing for the
"free movement of labor" without "discrimination based on nationality," the Council has not gone so far as to abolish the requirement
of work and residence permits for foreign laborers-although it is
clear that nationals of member states have the right to be issued such
permits.165 On the other hand, the Council's "general program" for
the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment specifically
requires the ending of restrictions which "condition access" to business "on an authorization or on the issuance of a document, such as
a foreign merchant's card." 166 As to capital movements, the Council's
directive implementing article 67 does, it is true, require "general"
and presumably blanket "authorizations" for certain types of investment transactions.161 But this is restricted essentially to the acquisition of listed securities, and in any event the directive preserves the
right of states "to verify the nature and authenticity of the transactions . . . [and] to take the measures essential for the prevention of
infringements of their laws and regulations." 168
Even under the Rome Treaty, then, at its present stage of implementation, it is possible that an authorization mechanism for direct
investments is permissible, when that mechanism does no more than
permit a state to assure itself that the proposed investment in fact
qualifies under the treaty and does not endanger essential security
interests. However, due to the universally held view that Commulic, under which corporations "constituted in conformity with the laws of one of the
parties and having their siege social on its territory" were given the same rights as
individual nationals of the country. Convention of Establishment between France
and the Togolese Republic, art. 13, June 5, 1964. Decree No. 67-82, [1967} J.O. 1081
specifically exempts from the declaration procedures investments from countries
"dont l'institut d'emission est lie au Tresor franfais par une convention d'operation"
-these countries, which include Togo, were part of France's colonial empire. Contrary
to the treaty provision, the decree excludes investments by companies of these countries if they are under foreign control (art. V). Cf. art. 13 of the Franco-American
Treaty, under which France could deny the advantages of the treaty "to any com•
pany in the ownership or direction of which nationals of a third country • • • have
directly or indirectly a controlling interest ••••"
165. Regulation No. 38/64, art. 22, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. ,J 1053 (March 25,
1964); "Residence Permit," Verwaltungsgericht (Administrative Court) Berlin, Case No.
VG.I A 98/62, Oct. 26, 1962; Council Directive, March 25, 1964, arts. 3-5, 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. ,J1[ 1098-100 (March 25, 1964).
166. General Program, supra note 162, at 1115. However, the "right of permanent
residence" was still to be "evidenced by a residence permit,'' to be granted except for
"reasons of public order, safety or health." Council Directive of Feb. 25, 1964, 1 CCH
CoMM. MKT. REP. ,r 1349.17. See also note 149 supra.
167. Article 2, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1f 1653.
168. Article 5(1), 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 1f 1656.
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nity members have a treaty right to invest in France, the use of such
procedures either to delay or to deny particular qualified investments
might well bring into play Community action.

C. Enforcement of Treaty Obligations
While objective analysis of both the bi-national and multinational
treaty provisions casts some doubt on the validity of the entire system of foreign investment controls and leads to the conclusion that
in most circumstances denial of authorization of foreign investment
would constitute a violation of treaty obligations, there may be no
manner of practical recourse for the rejected investor, since it is
possible that no mechanism exists by which the legal rights created
by the treaty could be effectively enforced. A strictly legal analysis
of the remedies available quickly reveals the difficulty of securing
judicial vindication of a treaty right in private litigation. The Chambre Criminelle of the French Gour de Cassation, to which criminal
prosecutions for violation of the investment regulations would be
referred, continues to adhere to the principle that only the executive branch of the government is competent to interpret treaties of
establishment. 169 Hence, the court would postpone ruling on a question involving the interpretation of treaties and would solicit the
binding advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered after consultation with the
Ministry of Finance, would, it may be thought, reject any proposed
treaty interpretation which would have the result of nullifying the
government's investment control program. An investor who failed
to comply with procedures called for by the foreign investment regulations would then be subject to criminal penalties applied by a
court, despite the fact that he could not obtain a judicial determination as to treaty defenses he might raise. Review of administrative
decisions by administrative tribunals would encounter a similar deference to government interpretations170 and would face the further
difficulty that only in situations of outright denial or, perhaps, in
169. Femme Aschbacher and Lertola, [1963] D. Jur. 531 (Cass. aim.); Coll, [1959]
Bull. Crim. 7, n.5; [1961] Rev. Crit. D.I.P. 136 (Cass. aim.); Proc. Gen. Colmar v.
Mongeluzzo, [1958] Bull. Crim. No. 632, at 1118, [1961] Rev. Crit. D.I.P. 136 (Cass.
crim.). The criminal chamber's renunciation of judicial interpretation of provisions of
international treaties, and its acceptance of the government's views, is not shared by
the First Section of the Civil Chamber which maintains its right to interpret treaties
except on questions of "public international law.'' Receveur-percepteur de Paris v.
Chassagne [1963] D. Jur. 529 (Cass. Civ. ler Sect.). However, as questions of failure to
obtain cartes de commerrant or to obey foreign investment controls call forth criminal
penalties, the views of the criminal chamber seem pertinent.
170. See, e.g., Hurni, [1965] Sem. Jur. II. 14172 bis (Conseil d'Etat); Soc. Commentry,
Fourchambault &: Decazeville, [1952] D. Jur. 454 (Conseil d'Etat); Union Regionale
Algerienne de la C.F.T.C. [1963] J. DROIT !Nr'L 402 (Conseil d'Etat).
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aggravated cases of delay would reviewable action have occurred. 171
Litigation brought by an individual to enforce rights under the
Treaty of Rome might well be determined entirely under French
procedures. The European Court of Justice is only competent to
hear suits brought by the Commission or by a member state; while
under article 177 of the Rome Treaty national courts of last resort
are "bound," in private litigations, to refer interpretations of the
treaty to the court, there is no possibilty of an appeal to the court
if this reference is not made. In a recent notable case before the Conseil d'Etat dealing with difficult questions under the Rome Treaty,
the Conseil retained for itself the power of final decision by holding
that the treaty provis_ion was clear on its face and was thus a question
of "application" rather than "interpretation."172 Of course, where a
French court finds that a treaty provision is clear on its face so as to
avoid reference to the Luxembourg court, the case would seem to
call for direct judicial "application" of the terms of the treaty without taking cognizance of the executive's interpretation. This seems,
however, to offer but a scant hope of breaking the closed interpretive loop, and the prospects of success in private litigation are not
bright.
Evaluation of the prospects of success in litigation is, moreover,
largely a theoretical exercise, for a disappointed investor is not often
a potential litigator. Under the old exchange control laws, no suit
was ever brought to review the denial of a foreign investment application. A survey taken of American businesses in France during the
restrictive investment period of 1965 shows that among companies
which considered themselves subject to discrimination or treatment
contrary to the spirit of the Establishment Treaty, no thought was
given to seeking diplomatic intervention, let alone a battle in
the French courts.173 The investor simply has no desire to antagonize
the government of the country in which he wishes to operate.
This apparent lack of desire to seek judicial determination of
foreign investment questions demonstrates that it may well be misleading to approach the problem in terms of a traditional legal analysis of rights and remedies. To some extent, all treaties-treaties of
alliance are the most extreme example-represent merely an indica171. See M. WALINE, DROIT AnMINISTRATIF 207-14 (9th ed. 1963). The "adjournment" mechanism of Law No. 66-1008, [1966] J.O. 11621, might be interpreted as constituting a statutory exception to the "implicit rejection" which French law presumes after
a four-month silence on the part of the administration.
172. Societe des Petroles Shell-Berre, (Conseil d'Etat), 1 CCH Cor.m. MKT. REP. 1l
4656.55 (1964), [1964] J. DROIT lNT'L 794.
173. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON COMMERCIAL TREATIES, ABA SECTION OF INT'L &
COMP. LAW 18 (1965).
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tion of present willingness, a sign of a present climate. Conceptions
of national purpose and of the proper direction of the national economy may change, and, as to matters which it conceives to be closely
tied to its essential interests, it is ultimately impossible to force a nation to acquiesce in past perspectives. Furthermore, it can only be
shortsighted to attempt to impose capital investment on any nation
against its will; whatever "success" is gained by diplomatic or judicial agitation can only be short-lived, given a state's ability to take,
perhaps without possibility of recourse, punitive measures against
enterprises once they have built up a substantial investment. Encouragement of international trade and investment, however desirable, is not accomplished through insistence on supposed treaty rights
which another nation is no longer willing to recognize. Should an
investing country insist on the recognition of its supposed treaty
rights in circumstances which the recipient country viewed as inimical to its national security or well-being, the only foreseeable result
would be the modification of the treaty. As the Franco-American
Treaty may, by its terms, be terminated in 1969, the American government has, no doubt, taken this factor into account in determining
its actions.
While the Rome Treaty offers additional guarantees of freedom
of investment, it is the economic conditions of the Community and
the political pressures by other member states for freedom of trade
within the Community, rather than appeals to judicial determination of treaty rights, that may be expected to limit the use by France
of its investment controls. Investors of states not members of the
Community may be expected to profit less from the opportunity to
assert against France legal benefits arising under the treaty by reason of an establishment in another Community country than from
the opportunity to use such an establishment as an alternative to
investment in France.174

VII.

PERSPECTIVES

The reservation by France of the right to screen foreign investments should not come as a surprise. While the language of the 1959
Franco-American Treaty may be antipathetic to such screening, it is
clear that changes in the amount and method of foreign, and particularly American, investment have caused the French government to
conclude that such control is essential to its national interest. In this
174. For a full expose of how American companies have made use of EEC investment opportunities, as well as of problems of American investment, see SERVAN·
SCHREIBER, supra note 140.
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limited way, France is espousing a position that has been adopted
by many less-developed countries since World War II, a position
which has made it nearly impossible for the United States to
negotiate treaties of establishment permitting complete freedom of
investment with such countries.175
The extent of these reservations should not be exaggerated. The
conclusion that a particular investment presents net economic and
political disadvantages will, it is to be expected, result in disapproval
only in aggravated cases. There is no reason, for example, for screening to have any effect on the hundreds of routine foreign investments
annually made in France. The decision of an American to set up a
small service company, a retail store, or a distribution outlet in
France would warrant but little concern in terms of that conception
of the national interest which motivates the investment controls. The
investments which may affect such interests are those made by such
corporations as International Business Machines, General Electric,
or General Motors. Here, the economic, social, and political impacts
are so great as to require careful governmental study. But even in
such cases, the likely result will be approval of the investment.
Perhaps one may also anticipate that the extraordinary veto power
will be applied with diminishing frequency as the French economy
integrates with that of the other members of the European Economic
Community and larger European-owned industries are created,
thereby lessening the fear of American domination.
New and more rigid applications of France's investment controls
may be occasioned by the recently instituted American controls
on capital transfers abroad.176 The new American measures affect
the French economy in three ways: they practically declare a moratorium on new direct investment in France through the exportation of capital from the United States; 177 they limit the amount of
earnings of French subsidiaries that may be reinvested in Western
Europe; 178 and they require the repatriation of a portion of the earnings of French subsidiaries of American companies.179 While this
moratorium seems, at first glance, to limit drastically, if not to curtail
fully, the number of new declarations of United States' direct investments which will be made in France, in fact this may not be the final
175. See Metzger, The Individual and International Law: Property Interests [Summer Conference on Int'l Law, Cornell University (1964)], in 1 S. METZGER, I.Aw OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 102 (1966).
176. Executive Order No. 11387, 15 C.F.R. pt. 1000 (1968).
177. 15 C.F.R. §§ 1000.503 &: .504{a){3) (1968) (a basic $100,000 limit).
178. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.504(a)(3) (1968).
179. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.202 (1968).
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result. A noteworthy exception to the new United States Department
of Commerce regulations permits American companies and their
foreign subsidiaries to raise money abroad (including Euro-Dollars)
for foreign direct investments; 180 thus, it may be assumed that United
States' investment in France will not be totally prevented, even
though financing will be more costly if new pressures on the European capital market drive interest rates up. But this dual United
States' policy of prohibiting American dollars from leaving the country, while permitting foreign investment through foreign borrowing, might make it increasingly difficult for French companies
to raise money at reasonable rates and consequently may encounter
resistance in France. The French government, under the broad powers granted by the new law, in pursuance of its own economic
and political goals, including a desire to strengthen its balance of
payments, could well decide to impose special restrictions on recourse by foreign companies to the French capital market. This
could effectively be accomplished by requiring foreign investments
in France to be made only with capital imported from abroad, a
requirement which had been imposed in every investment license
under the pre-1967 exchange controls and which had been imposed
to some degree in investments processed under the 1967 procedures
even prior to the new United States' controls.181 Moreover, as the
Ministry of Finance apparently finds "discriminatory" the newly
enacted United States' regulations requiring foreign subsidiaries of
American firms to repatriate earnings, further actions, such as the
re-evaluation of the status of these French companies, and the conditions of their access to the financial market and terms of bank
credit, may be considered.182
Despite the prospect of continuing and even expanding application of French foreign investment controls it may be hoped that, as
to American investment, these controls will be applied in the spirit
in which, as expressed by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, the
1959 treaty was signed:
Henceforth, when substantial amounts of capital are to be invested
180. 15 C.F.R. § 1000.504(b) (1968).
181. In some cases, the Ministry of Finance has required direct investors to modify
their proposed investments to increase the percentage of capital obtained from foreign
sources and to reduce, consequently, contemplated local borrowings. In certain other
cases the Ministry has required that increases in a French subsidiary's capital structure be accomplished with money exported by the foreign parent.
182. Statement attributed to Minister of Finance Michel Debre. Le Monde, Jan. 9,
1968, at 15, col. 3; International Herald Tribune, Jan. 8, 1968, at I, col. 5. One of the
reasons which might lead to such actions would be excessive demands by those French
subsidiaries on the French money market in view of their need to repatriate earnings.
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in either country or enterprises established for export-import, those
concerned will receive without difficulty the necessary authorizations
for admission, residence and establishment. In general, requests from
citizens wishing to establish themselves in the other country will be
considered favorably. Companies, subsidiaries, branches and agencies
from the other country will receive the same treatment as nationals.183

The greatest barrier to the realization of these hopes is the very
concrete possibility that the new controls will be considered by their
administrators to be permanent and not temporary in nature, and
that their full exercise will be considered to be normal rather than
unusual. Unless the French authorities guard against this, the administration of "screening" apparatus may soon resemble the edifice of
exchange controls which was so recently and welcomely demolished.
183. Remarks of Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to the Annual Meeting of
the American Chamber of Commerce in France, Jan. 19, 1960, quoted in COMMERCE
IN FRANCE No. 238, at 2 (1967).

